Trembly v. Mrs. Fields Cookies : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1993
Trembly v. Mrs. Fields Cookies : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Randall N. Skanchy; Deno G. Himonas; Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough.
Russell C. Fericks; Nathan R. Hyde; Gerald J. Lallatin; Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson; Attorneys
for Defendant.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Trembly v. Mrs. Fields Cookies, No. 930635 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1993).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/5721
UTAH CC« w OF APPEALS 
D 
K - u 
DOCKET NO. . ^ 3 - " 0 ( 7 3 5 ^ 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JOE D. TREMBLY 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
MRS. FIELDS COOKIES 
CORPORATION, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
Supreme Court Case N o*^H^HHf 
Priority No. 15 
93-0635-^ 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal From Summary Judgment Entered 
in the Third District Court Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
The Honorable David S. Young 
RUSSELL C. FERICKS 
NATHAN R. HYDE 
GERALD J. LALLATIN 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor 
50 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465 
Telephone: (801) 531-2000 
Fax No.: (801) 532-5506 
Randall N. Skanchy, Esq. 
Deno G. Himonas, Esq. 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
1500 First Interstate Plaza 
17 0 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
FILED 
Utah Court of Appeals 
OCT 1 2 1993 
j T. Noonan 
Clerk of the Court 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JOE D. TREMBLY 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
MRS. FIELDS COOKIES 
CORPORATION, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
Supreme Court Case No. 930290 
Priority No. 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal From Summary Judgment Entered 
in the Third District Court Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
The Honorable David S. Young 
RUSSELL C. FERICKS 
NATHAN R. HYDE 
GERALD J. LALLATIN 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor 
50 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465 
Telephone: (801) 531-2 000 
Fax No.: (801) 532-5506 
Randall N. Skanchy, Esq. 
Deno G. Himonas, Esq. 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
1500 First Interstate Plaza 
170 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
JURISDICTION 1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 1 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
I. Nature of Case 2 
II. Course of Proceedings 3 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 6 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 13 
ARGUMENT 14 
POINT I 
RELIEF FROM THE LAW OF THIS CASE SHOULD 
BE CAUTIOUSLY CONSIDERED 14 
POINT II 
THE GENERAL LAW ON IMPLIED-IN-FACT EMPLOYMENT 
CONTRACTS 16 
POINT III 
EVIDENCE OF MFC'S INTENT AND TREMBLY'S 
REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF "FOR CAUSE" 
CONTRACT TERMS 19 
CONCLUSION 2 5 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Page 
Cases 
Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 
771 P.2d 1033 (Utah 1989) 16 
Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. State, 
779 P.2d 634 (Utah 1989) 2 
Caldwell v. Ford, Bacon & Davis Utah, Inc., 
777 P.2d 483 (Utah 1989) 17 
Gilmore v. Salt Lake Area Community Action 
Program, 775 P.2d 940 (Utah App. 1989), 16, 17 
Harward v. Harward, 
526 P.2d 1183 (Utah 1974) 1 
Heslop v. Bank of Utah, 
839 P.2d 828 (Utah 1992) 18, 22 
Hodgson v. Bunzl Utah, Inc., 
844 P.2d 331 (Utah 1992) 14, 15, 16, 17, 25 
Jackson v. Dabney, 
645 P.2d 613 (Utah 1982) 2 
Johnson v. Morton Thiokol, 
818 P.2d 997 (Utah 1991) 16, 21 
Laub v. South Cent. Utah Tel. Ass'n, 
657 P.2d 1304 (Utah 1982) 14, 15 
Lincoln Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. D.T. Southern 
Properties, 838 P.2d 672 (Utah App. 1992) 15 
Sanderson v. First Sec. Leasing, 
844 P.2d 303 (Utah 1992) 14, 15, 16, 17 
Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 
685 P.2d 1081 (Wash. 1984) 18 
Thurston v. Box Elder County, 
835 P.2d 165 (Utah 1992) 17, 18 
11 
Rules and Statutes 
Page 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3 (3) (k) 1 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56 2 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60(b)(7) . . . 2, 13, 14 
iii 
JURISDICTION 
The jurisdiction of the Utah Court of Appeals is 
conferred by Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(3)(k) and by Order of 
the Supreme Court of Utah dated October 6, 1993 pouring-over this 
case. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
First Issue: 
1. Did the District Court err by hearing the 
defendant/appellee's Motion for Relief from Order either because 
no new facts were presented in support or because the motion was 
contrary to the "law of the case" doctrine (i.e., a District 
Court judge may not vacate the prior decision of another District 
Court judge)? 
Standard of Review 
The trial judge reviewed the determination of his 
predecessor, and determined, as a matter of law, that his 
predecessor was incorrect. This exercise of appellate review is 
entitled to no deference. Harward v. Harward, 526 P.2d 1183 
(Utah 1974). 
Second Issue: 
2. Was summary dismissal of plaintiff/appellant's 
causes of action in error because employment policy statements 
and conduct, when considered in a light most favorable to him, 
establish an implied-in-fact employment relationship whereby he 
could only be terminated after disciplinary counseling and an 
opportunity to correct deficiencies? 
Standard of Review 
Because summary judgment is granted as a matter of law, 
the Court may review the District Court's conclusions of law 
without according them any deference, viewing the facts in the 
light most favorable to Appellants. Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. 
State, 779 P.2d 634 (Utah 1989). Summary judgment is not 
appropriate where a genuine issue of material fact exists and 
where, on the basis of the facts in the record, reasonable minds 
could differ. Jackson v. Dabney, 645 P.2d 613 (Utah 1982). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Rules 56 and 60(b)(7), Utah Rules Civil Procedure, 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of Case. 
Plaintiff and Appellant, Joe Trembly, was hired by 
Defendant and Appellee Mrs. Fields Cookies ("MFC") on 
November 26, 1986 and was subsequently promoted to a number of 
responsible positions in the organization. After having been off 
work because of an extended illness, Trembly was placed in a 
temporary supervisory assignment on February 15, 1990. On 
March 13, 1990, he was summarily terminated. 
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Trembly brought an action against MFC in the Third 
Judicial District Court for Summit County, State of Utah alleging 
that he had been improperly terminated in violation of 
defendant's implied-in-fact agreement that he would only be 
terminated for cause and after reasonable notice of deficiencies 
and opportunities for correction. In various pleadings, Trembly 
presented MFC's documents and explicit statements and actions by 
MFC's owners and executives which created an implied-in-fact 
agreement that he would not be terminated without cause, 
II. Course of Proceedings. 
Significantly, this case is pending in the Third 
Judicial District Court in and for Summit County. As such, it 
has been subject to the revolving trial judge arrangements 
prevailing on that bench. On November 27, 1991, a hearing was 
held before then-sitting Judge Homer Wilkinson on MFC's Motion 
for Summary Judgment. (R. at 327.) The Motion sought dismissal 
of all of plaintiff's causes of action. Judge Wilkinson 
dismissed some of them but left intact Trembly's claim of an 
implied-in-fact contract. (R. at 320, see Addendum.) 
Before an order was entered, MFC filed a Motion for 
Reconsideration of the court's denial of summary judgment on the 
implied-in-fact contract issue. (R. at 321-332.) On 
February 21, 1992, Judge Wilkinson, having considered the Motion 
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for Reconsideration, entered a Minute Entry allowing the implied-
in-fact contact claim to remain. (R. at 360, see Addendum.) 
Between July 1, 1992 and December 31, 1992, the 
presiding trial judge was Frank G. Noel. On July 13, 1992, he 
entered a scheduling order setting jury trial for December 15, 
1992. (R. at 433 & 434, see Addendum.) On August 11, 1992, MFC 
filed a Motion in Limine seeking to preclude Trembly from 
introducing evidence of MFC's specific promises of fairness and 
MFC's stayed discipline policy. (R. at 435-461, see Addendum.) 
This was the very evidence on which Judge Wilkinson relied in 
declining MFC summary judgment (and reconsideration) on the 
implied-in-fact employment contract issue. 
Trembly opposed the Motion in Limine, again with 
extensive citation to the depositions, documents and affidavits 
supporting a "for cause" employment agreement. (R. at 477-551.) 
MFC claimed these statements were irrelevant to Trembly's charge 
that it had abandoned the at-will presumption. 
Judge Noel did not grant the Motion in Limine in either 
this or a companion case styled Power v. Riverview Fin, (a/k/a 
Mrs. Fields Cookies, (District Court Case No. 10741) which was 
then scheduled for trial on November 10, 1992. In essence, Judge 
Noel found Trembly's evidence of an implied-in-fact contract 
sufficient to require jury considerations, just as Judge 
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Wilkinson had done earlier. Because of difficulties with the 
court's calendar, the December 15, 1992 trial date was used for 
the companion case Power v. Riverview Fin, now pending before 
this Court as Case No. 930535-CA and Trembly's trial was 
rescheduled by Judge Noel for March 23, 1993. (R. at 615, 616A 
and 625.) 
On January 1, 1993, Judge David S. Young took the 
Summit County District Court bench. He changed the trial setting 
from March 23, 1993 to April 28, 1993. On April 2, 1993, MFC 
filed a Motion for Relief From [Judge Wilkinson's] Order denying 
MFC Motion for Summary Judgment on Trembly's claim of an 
implied-in-fact employment contract. (R. at 657-659.) In 
support of its Motion for Relief (f/k/a a motion to reconsider), 
MFC cited the publication of two Utah Supreme Court opinions as 
the basis for reconsideration. No new facts were offered in 
support of the Motion for Relief. Trembly objected to the motion 
both on the merits and on the propriety of a district court judge 
overruling the "law of the case" as established by another 
district court judge. (R. at 782-852.) 
On April 15, 1993, Judge Young made a Minute Entry 
effectively vacating Judge Wilkinson's February 21, 1992 Minute 
Entry, thereby granting MFC's Motion for Summary Judgment on the 
implied-in-fact contract claim. (R. at 781.) Judge Young's 
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Minute Entry of April 15, 1993 is a curious non sequitur: 
"Court, after hearing argument on [MFC's] Motion for Relief from 
the "at will" contract is granted finding "at-will" is not 
implied. Court finds employee has not met his burden." Id. In 
so doing, Judge Young displaced the jury as fact finder by 
declaring ". . . it is a question of law to determine whether the 
at-will contractual relationship has been modified in some way to 
create an implied-in-fact agreement that was different from the 
at-will agreement." (R. at 874.) This statement of the law is 
wrong. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. About the time Trembly was hired, November 26, 
1986, Mitchell Dorin, then Regional Director of Operations 
("RDO"), told Trembly that he could not be terminated unless the 
disciplinary process was followed and he would be allowed "X 
amount of mistakes before you're terminated. . . . You know, we 
have to follow this process of Stages I, II, III, and IV before 
we can discipline you. . . . " (Joe D. Trembly Depo., pp. 
156-157) (R. at 195.) 
2. Trembly and MFC, by its Chairman Randy Fields, had 
a verbal understanding that employees 
will not be terminated for things unless 
they've been investigated, completely 
investigated fairly, okay and that if you are 
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honest, you make a mistake, all those things 
you will not be in trouble for because we 
treat you fairly. . . . So, you know, if I 
didn't do anything dishonestly, then I didn't 
have to worry about my job. 
(Trembly Depo., p. 35, lines 2-14, R. at 196 and at 221.) 
3. When Trembly was trained as a District Sale 
Manager ("DSM"), and in materials Trembly used several times in 
training others, Randy Fields said the values of the company were 
more important than the training manual and that first and 
foremost is fair treatment of employees. Trembly understood 
MFC's at-will employment policy to include fair treatment. 
(Trembly Depo., pp. 33-34, R. at 196 and at 219-220.) 
4. During Trembly's employment, MFC's Policy and 
Procedures Manual contained the following words of limitation to 
the company's right to terminate employment at-will: 
Philosophy. . . . 
For example, no person should be terminated 
if he or she did not know, or should not have 
known, what was expected. . . . 
If an employee, for some reason is not 
performing to expectations, you should verify 
that he/she understands what he/she must do 
to be performing successfully. 
(Personnel Section 7.0 - Disciplinary Process - p. 1, R. at 196 
and at 248; Mrs. Fields Training Manual How to Discipline, p. 65, 
R. at 254.) 
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5. MFC's Policy and Procedures Manual Personnel 
Section 7.0 also describes as General Rules: 
DID THE EMPLOYEE KNOW OR SHOULD HE/SHE HAVE 
KNOWN OF THE DISCIPLINARY CONSEQUENCES OF 
HIS/HER CONDUCT? . . . 
A trivial offense does not merit harsh 
discipline unless the employee was guilty of 
the same or similar offense a number of times 
in the past. 
(Personnel Section 7.0 - Disciplinary Process - p. 2, R. at 197 
and 249; Mrs. Fields Training Manual How to Discipline, p. 66, -
attached as "Exhibit C") 
6. In the video film "What We Stand For," intended 
for all employees and used by Trembly numerous multiple times to 
train other MFC employees, MFC founders and principal officers 
Randy and Debbi Fields present the overriding philosophy of the 
company. Debbi Fields says, "The fourth component: fair 
treatment of all—this is part of our foundation." And then 
Randy Fields explains what this principle means: 
We mean to treat people fairly. . . . Treat 
somebody that reports to you exactly the way 
you would want to be treated. Let me give 
you an example of what's not fair. Let's 
suppose you have somebody that's not a good 
performer. . . . Here's what's not fair: not 
saying anything to them, then scheduling them 
out of the company. . . . That's not fair. 
Let me tell you what else is not fair. 
Without warning, you walk in for some 
relatively minor infraction of the rules and 
firing them. They never knew that they were 
doing something wrong—they had no 
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communication on the subject whatsoever. 
That's not fair. . . . 
And what we mean by fair is in some sense a 
communication issue. . . . "Hold 
accountable" means something really simple. 
That once I've instructed you as to how you 
are to be or to behave . . . and once you 
have got that and demonstrated that you 
understand it, then my expectation is that 
that's how it will be, and failure to do that 
results in discipline and ultimately 
continued failure to do it results in leaving 
the job at our request. That's a polite way 
of describing being fired. (Randy Fields, 
Transcript - "What We Stand For," pp. 14-15.) 
Debbi Fields corroborates Randy's explanation: 
I want to make sure that people are treated 
fairly. That this company represents a code 
of ethics and that we will work to make sure 
that everybody in this organization is told 
how to be better, how to be more effective. 
. . . We're not perfect. . . . I'm going to 
make mistakes. So I always need correction 
or need direction and if I need it, I can 
guarantee you'll need it. (Debbi Fields, 
Transcript - "What We Stand For," pp. 16-17). 
(R. at 197-198.) 
7. MFC's supposed at-will policy was limited by the 
terms that no employee be terminated arbitrarily and 
capriciously, nor without reason. (MFC Director of Human 
Resources, Daniel Murphy Depo., p. 103, R. at 198.) 
8. Cindy Reisner, then MFC's Personnel Manager, told 
Trembly that as a DSM, he could not terminate any employee 
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"without just cause." (Trembly Depo., pp. 41-42; R. at 199 and 
at 222-223.) 
9. In October of 1989 Trembly was DSM for the entire 
state of Florida and was considered a "strong employee" whose 
performance was recognized by MFC's founder Debbi Fields. 
(Trembly Depo., pp. 44-45, 155; R. at 199; Keller Memo, Reisner 
Depo. Exhibit 10; R. at 271.) 
10. In late October, Trembly became ill and was placed 
on leave. Because Trembly was a valued employee, Jess Ewing, 
Senior Regional Director for the entire company decided that MFC 
should pay for Trembly to make two trips to West Virginia to see 
a doctor and be with his family. (Trembly Depo., pp. 44-45, 155; 
R. at 199 and 224-225; Keller Memo, Reisner Depo. Exhibit 10; 
R. at 271-272.) 
11. MFC did not assign anyone to act as DSM during the 
period of Trembly's medical leave, and as a consequence, the 
performance of the stores in the district suffered. (Trembly 
Depo., pp. 45-46; R. at 199 and 226; Keller Memo, Reisner Depo. 
Exhibit 10; R. at 271.) 
12. Although not fully recovered, Trembly returned to 
work in January 1990 on a reduced hour schedule, with the 
understanding that in February Trembly would assume supervision 
of all Marriott stores in Florida and assist Kerri Keller 
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("Keller11) , the new Regional Director of Operations, in training 
new DSM's. (Trembly Depo., pp. 44-47, 167; R. at 199-200 and at 
224-227; Keller Memo to File, Reisner Depo. Exhibit 10; R. at 
271.) 
13. Because of the poor condition of the stores in the 
district, Keller appointed Trembly as acting DSM for the new 
South Florida District on February 15, 1990. In addition to 
these new duties, Keller instructed Trembly to remain on the 
premises of an understaffed store in another district to complete 
the training of the manager, and to continue supervision of the 
Marriott stores. (Trembly Depo., pp. 44-47, 167; R. at 200 and 
224-227; Keller Memo to File, Reisner Depo. Exhibit 10; R. at 
271. ) 
14. In February 1990, Keller informed Trembly of a 
plan to eventually terminate for cause Barbara Pizzutelli, Sherri 
Mimnaugh, Sally Oberg and Mary Belcastro who were store managers 
in his district, to put training and assistance to these managers 
on hold, and to begin to document their shortcomings since it 
would be necessary to go through the stages of discipline. 
(Trembly Depo., pp. 58-59, 228, 230-31; R. at 200 and 228-299.) 
15. Shortly thereafter, and also in February 1990, 
Keller toured the Florida area with MFC Director of Operations, 
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Paul Baird. Keller and Baird noted deficiencies in the area 
under Trembly's control. (R. at 272.) 
16. After their tour, Keller was instructed by Baird 
to "find something11 on Trembly that would justify termination, 
even though she knew of no such reason. (Theresa L. Barr 
Affidavit, R. at 200-201 and at 278.) 
17. On March 9, 1990, Keller appeared unannounced in 
the store where Trembly was working. Keller told Trembly he was 
the subject of investigation, that she could not discuss the 
investigation, and that he was suspended pending further actions. 
(Trembly Depo., p. 4, R. at 201 and at 229.) 
18. On March 11, 1990, Trembly called MFC's Director 
of Human Resources, Cindy Reisner ("Reisner"), who refused to 
tell him why he was suspended, except that she had contacted the 
managers in his area and as a consequence, had solicited written 
statements from the managers concerning his performance. She 
told him she was not allowed to disclose the nature of the 
statements by the managers, either then or in the future. 
(Trembly Depo., pp. 86-88, R. at 201 and at 229-230.) 
19. On March 13, 1990, Keller terminated Trembly, 
telling him the investigation was completed, that he had not been 
performing his duties as DSM, and Baird had instructed Keller to 
terminate Trembly as a result of statements MFC received from 
12 
managers Trembly had been supervising for about three weeks. 
Trembly was not allowed to see the statements or know the nature 
of the comments. (Trembly Depo., pp. 94-96; R. at 201 and at 
229-230; Kerri Keller Memo to File, Cindy Reisner Deposition 
Exhibit 10; R. at 272.) 
20. After the fact, Trembly discovered that his 
termination was based on statements from the very four managers 
he had been instructed by Keller to not assist and to terminate 
for lack of performance. These managers primarily complained of 
lack of support from Trembly. (Trembly Depo. Exhibits 15, 16, 17 
and 18; R. at 202 and at 231-242.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I: RELIEF FROM THE LAW OF THIS CASE SHOULD BE CAUTIOUSLY 
CONSIDERED. 
Rule 60(b)(7), Utah Rule of Civil Procedure, should be 
applied only in unusual or exceptional circumstances. Because 
(1) MFC did not introduce any new evidence, and (2) the cases 
cited by MFC as support for its Motion do not state any change in 
implied-in-fact employment contract law, the trial court was not 
justified in overruling Judge Wilkinson's prior determination. 
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POINT II: THE GENERAL LAW ON IMPLIED-IN-FACT EMPLOYMENT 
CONTRACTS• 
The question of whether the at-will employment 
presumption has been overcome is a question of fact reserved for 
the jury. The two cases cited by MFC as justification for its 
motion, Hodgson v. Bunzl Utah, Inc., 844 P.2d 331 (Utah 1992) and 
Sanderson v. First Sec. Leasing, 844 P.2d 303 (Utah 1992), do not 
change the requirement that courts should interpret employment 
contracts by harmonizing the overall meaning of the contract 
within the totality of the employment circumstances. 
POINT III: EVIDENCE OF MFC'S INTENT AND TREMBLY7S REASONABLE 
EXPECTATION OF "FOR CAUSE" CONTRACT TERMS. 
Trembly has alleged sufficient facts, which if true, 
would establish his reasonable expectation that his employment 
was n o t a t - w i l l . 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
RELIEF FROM THE LAW OF THIS 
CASE SHOULD BE CAUTIOUSLY CONSIDERED 
MFC relied on Rule 60(b)(7), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure for its Motion for Relief from [Judge Wilkinson's] 
order. The Supreme Court of Utah follows the admonition that 
Rule 60(b)(7) "should be very cautiously and sparingly invoked by 
the Court only in unusual and exceptional circumstances." Laub 
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v. South Cent. Utah Tel. Ass'n, 657 P.2d 1304, 1307-1308 (Utah 
1982) (quoting Hughes v. Sanders, 287 F. Supp. 332, 334 (E.D. 
Okla. 1968) ; See Lincoln Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. D.T. Southern 
Properties, 838 P.2d 672, 674 (Utah App. 1992). This is not such 
a case. 
In order to sustain Judge Young's decision of April 15, 
1993, MFC must show that the reasons it gave for relief from 
Judge Wilkinson's February 21, 1992 Minute Entry were 
extraordinary. Laub, 657 P.2d at 1306; Lincoln Benefit, 838 P.2d 
at 674. There was nothing extraordinary for Judge Young to 
consider. In the transcript of the April 15, 1993 hearing, he as 
much admits that he simply reconsidered the information available 
to Judge Wilkinson during summary judgment and during MFC's first 
Motion to Reconsider (and, incidentally, the information 
available to Judge Noel in the Motion in Limine), and came to a 
different conclusion by applying an erroneous "question of law" 
standard to the issue of implied-in-fact contract. (R. at 874-
875. ) 
The two "new" cases cited by MFC to Judge Young did not 
justify the relief he granted. Sanderson v. First Sec. Leasing, 
844 P.2d 303 (Utah 1992) and Hodgson v. Bunzl Utah, Inc., 844 
P.2d 331 (Utah 1992) did not change the implied-in-fact 
employment contract analysis. If anything, Sanderson and Hodgson 
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bolstered Judge Wilkinson's ruling that if a reasonable jury 
could find that MFC breached its implied-in-fact contract with 
Mr. Trembly, the case could not be disposed of on summary 
judgment. MFC offered no new evidence to justify changing that 
Judge Wilkinson's determination. 
POINT II 
THE GENERAL LAW ON 
IMPLIED-IN-FACT EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS 
The existence of an implied-in-fact contract "is a 
question of fact which turns on the objective manifestations of 
the parties' intent. As a question of fact, the intent of the 
parties is primarily a jury question." Johnson v. Morton 
Thiokol, Inc.. 818 P.2d 997, 1001 (Utah 1991). Neither Hodgson 
nor Sanderson change the requirement that courts should interpret 
employment contract terms by harmonizing the overall meaning of 
the contract. Judge Wilkinson's denial of summary judgment 
reflects his understanding of that point. 
Justice Zimmerman in Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 
771 P.2d 1033, 1052 (Utah 1989) states, "the representations made 
by the employer in employee manuals, bulletins, and the like are 
legitimate sources for determining the apparent intentions of the 
parties." Accord, Gilmore v. Salt Lake Area Community Action 
Program, 775 P.2d 940, 943 (Utah App. 1989), ("In order to 
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determine the nature of the employment contract, the court should 
consider the intent of the parties and the totality of the 
circumstances.ff) In Gilmore, summary judgment was not 
appropriate, even though the plaintiff was hired as an at-will 
employee, because the employer later changed the employment 
contract terms by issuing a manual that outlined appeal and 
discipline procedures. Id. The same thing happened with Trembly 
in the present case. 
Sanderson and Hodgson do restate principles which are 
in line with this Court's prior orders: "The existence of an 
implied-in-fact contract is a factual question committed to the 
sound discretion of the jury.11 Sanderson, 201 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 
19 (Utah 1992) ; "Summary judgment is appropriate only if a 
reasonable jury cannot find that an implied contract exists." 
Id., citing Caldwell v. Ford, Bacon & Davis Utah, Inc., 777 P.2d 
483, 486 (Utah 1989). 
In addition to the Hodgson and Sanderson cases, the 
Supreme Court of Utah has also clarified, since Judge Wilkinson 
denied MFC its Summary Judgment, an employer's ability to create 
an "atmosphere" upon which employees may justifiably rely, and 
which creates implied-in-fact contract terms. Thurston v. Box 
Elder County, 835 P.2d 165 (Utah 1992). Private employers do not 
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need to make specific implied contract promises to specific 
employees to create implied-in-fact contract terms, Id. 
Judge Young's premise (and MFC's argument) that general 
statements of fairness can never operate to waive the at-will 
presumption (see, i.e., R. at 884 from April 15, 1993 hearing) is 
simply wrong. It is the jury's prerogative to decide this 
factual issue on the totality of the evidence. In Thurston the 
Utah Supreme Court quotes from Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 
685 P.2d 1081, 1088 (Wash. 1984), to support the conclusion that 
employees have a right to rely on an employer's general policies 
to create implied-in-fact employment contract terms: 
Therefore, we hold that if an employer, for 
whatever reason, creates an atmosphere of job 
security and fair treatment with promises of 
specific treatment in specific situations and 
an employee is induced thereby to remain on 
the job and not actively seek other 
employment, those promises are enforceable 
components of the employment relationship. 
We believe that by his or her unilateral 
objective manifestation of intent, the 
employer creates an expectation, and thus an 
obligation of treatment in accord with those 
written promises. 
Thurston, 835 P.2d at 169 (emphasis added). This same point was 
emphasized in Heslop v. Bank of Utah, 839 P.2d 828 (Utah 1992): 
Under Berube, an employer may create an 
implied-in-fact contract for employment that 
is not a contract at-will. An employer does 
this by making representations or promises 
that employees reasonably understand to 
constitute something other than employment 
18 
at-will. Berube, which makes representations 
or promises of employment other than at-will 
legally enforceable, affects only those 
employers who make or imply such promises to 
their employees. Berube works no substantial 
injustice by requiring employers who 
expressly or impliedly promise employment for 
other than at-will to stand by that promise. 
Id. at 835-36 (emphasis added). 
POINT III 
EVIDENCE OF MFC'S INTENT 
AND TREMBLY'S REASONABLE EXPECTATION 
OF "FOR CAUSE" CONTRACT TERMS 
MFC did not dispute any of the factual citations in 
Trembly's memorandum to Judge Wilkinson opposing summary judgment 
(R. at 194-284) or in Trembly's memorandum to Judge Noel opposing 
MFC's Motion in Limine (R. at 477-551) or his memorandum to Judge 
Young opposing MFC's Motion for Relief (R. at 782-852). Rather, 
MFC argued that in spite of Trembly's extensive documentary, 
video, and deposition evidence, no reasonable jury could find 
that MFC relinquished the "at-will" presumption. MFC's Motion 
for Relief was a pure fact-finding invitation which Judge Young 
improperly accepted and incorrectly decided. It would be hard to 
articulate a case with clearer issues of material fact. 
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A. Examination of MFC's Factual Claims: 
MFC's Regional Director of Operations, Mitchell Dorin, 
who told Trembly at the time he was hired that he could not be 
terminated unless a disciplinary process was followed. 
MFC's Handbook equivocates and suggests reliance on 
higher authorities for the actual terms and conditions of 
employment. "We do not expect this handbook to answer all of 
your questions. Your supervisor will be your major source of 
information." (R. at 789.) Trembly's supervisors and MFC's 
owners themselves explained numerous times that termination 
required compliance with the disciplinary process. And, while 
the handbook does "supersede all prior handbooks, manuals, 
policies and procedures issued by The Company," it also allows 
that "The Company" may, at any time, in its sole discretion, 
modify or vary from anything stated in this handbook." (R. at 
789.) The conduct and oral representations of MFC's management, 
Mr. Trembly's direct and higher supervisors, and the very owners 
of the Company did vary from the Handbook's equivocal reservation 
of the at-will presumption. 
Interestingly, with all of the argument about at-will 
by MFC's lawyers, no one at MFC ever claimed that Trembly was 
terminated for anything other than cause. MFC's Regional 
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Director of Operations, Kerri Keller, gave only "for cause" 
reasons for his termination, 
Not completing standard DSM duties, i.e., 
visiting and calling stores on a regular 
basis period. Not properly training the 
managerial team to handle normal situations 
encountered on a daily basis, period. 
(R. at 790.) Under deposition questioning by MFC's own counsel, 
Keller confirmed the "for cause" reasons: 
Answer: Yes. The primary reason for 
termination was improper treatment 
of people. All the other items 
listed [on the termination report] 
were included in the reasons for 
termination. 
Question: Does this document accurately 
reflect all the reasons for 
termination? 
Answer: Yes it does. 
(R. at 790-791.) 
Having set its hand to terminating Mr. Trembly for 
cause through the disciplinary process, MFC was not at liberty to 
switch tracks and claim absolution from the at-will presumption. 
That is not the holding of Johnson v. Morton Thiokol, 818 P.2d 
997 (Utah 1991), where the Supreme Court carefully determined 
that the employer complied with its procedures for termination of 
the plaintiff. In this case, Mr. Trembly's termination was 
improper because it did not comply with the procedures for staged 
21 
discipline and it was inconsistent with MFC's express policies of 
fairness. 
B. Additional Evidence Supporting Trembly's Understanding of 
For-Cause Employment. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Heslop v. Bank of Utah, 8 39 
P.2d 828 (Utah 1992), acknowledged that the understanding of 
other employees about company policies was relevant to a 
determination of the reasonableness of employment expectations. 
839 P.2d at 830-31. After denial of MFC's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, several depositions of past MFC employees were taken. 
One was of Craig Atnip, the Regional Director of Operations who 
supervised Trembly for several years. 
Atnip's testimony showed that Trembly's expectations 
were reasonable and consistent with objective reality within the 
Company. For instance, Trembly had been promised fairness by 
being informed of what was expected of him, having reasonable 
opportunity to fulfill those expectations, and being given notice 
and an opportunity to correct any deficiencies. Atnip testified 
as follows: 
Question: Why would you emphasize 
fairness as a policy of the 
Company when you were hiring 
somebody? 
The Witness: Because fairness and treatment 
of people was very important 
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to the Company. And fairness 
and treatment of people was 
one issue that was very 
important to Mrs. Fields. 
(R. at 792.) 
Atnip went on to explain that there were "specific 
steps" that had to be followed when anyone was being terminated, 
including approval by supervision and upper management "to make 
sure that the Company did their part as far as working with the 
individual, training the individual and letting them know — and 
most important, letting them know what was expected and when it 
was expected by." (R. at 792.) Atnip himself followed these 
procedures and standards because of "training and guidance" he 
had received from MFC. (R. at 792-793.) 
Later in his deposition, Atnip testified that the 
discipline procedures and the stages of correction were followed 
under every circumstance of which he was aware; that he never 
terminated any employee without a reason; and that it would have 
been inconsistent with Company policies to terminate someone 
without a reason or to terminate them because he did not like 
them or had bad feelings about them. (R. at 793.) Finally, 
Atnip verified that his understanding about the Company's 
policies with regard to discipline was derived in part from 
representations made by Debbie and Randy Fields in the tape "What 
We Stand For." (R. at 793.) 
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Another deposition taken after Judge Wilkinson denied 
summary judgment motion was that of Theresa Barr. Barr was a DSM 
operating at the same level as Mr. Trembly in a region of Florida 
adjacent to his. She testified that before she became aware of 
Trembly's lawsuit against MFC she had never heard the term "at-
will11 before; she had never received any special training in what 
at-will meant or how it functioned in the employment 
relationship; and she never heard anyone use the term "at-will" 
in conjunction with Trembly's termination. (R. at 794.) With 
regard to Trembly's termination, Barr explained that "her 
friend," Kerri Keller, came to Florida "to get something [on 
Trembly] and get rid of him" on instructions from Keller's 
supervisor, MFC Director of Operations, Paul Baird. (R. at 794.) 
Keller also told Barr that she wanted to get rid of Mr. Trembly 
because he had made her look bad in Baird's and Keller's February 
1990 Florida inspection tour. (R. at 794.) Barr agrees that the 
termination of Trembly was unfair because Keller demanded that 
Trembly simultaneously perform conflicting objectives which he 




In the first instance, this case should be remanded 
because Judge Young failed to follow the law of the case 
doctrine. In essence, he second guessed Judge Homer Wilkinson's 
denial of Motion for Summary Judgment and denial of Motion for 
Reconsideration. In so doing, he also bypassed the determination 
of Judge Frank Noel that Trembly's evidence of an implied-in-fact 
contract was substantial and relevant, thus justifying denial of 
MFC's Motion in Limine. This appeal can be disposed of 
completely on this issue, with remand for trial on the merits. 
With regard to Judge Young's entry of summary judgment 
against Trembly, the Utah Supreme Court and the Utah Court of 
Appeals have reaffirmed numerous times that the question of 
whether the at-will presumption has been overcome is a question 
of fact reserved for the jury. It is only when no reasonable 
jury could find "for cause" terms of employment that the court is 
authorized to bypass the constitutional right to jury trial and 
direct entry of judgment in favor of the employer. In conducting 
its analysis, the trial court must look to the employer's conduct 
and oral disclosures to determine the intent of the parties, and 
to judge the "circumstances as a whole." Hodgson v. Bunzl Utah, 
Inc., 844 P.2d 331, 334 (Utah 1992). Judge Young didn't do that. 
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Typically, summary judgment motions are defeated (or 
reversed on appeal) by the plaintiff showing one or two material 
facts which support his case. The extensive reference and 
recitation to facts supporting Trembly's case goes far beyond the 
usual requirement. Even so, it is not exhaustive. Trembly is 
entitled to present all of his evidence in support of his case in 
a comprehensive manner, as previously and correctly authorized by 
Judge Wilkinson. This conclusion is more than borne out by the 
evidence summarized above. 
Trembly respectfully asks this Court to set aside Judge 
Young's minute entry granting MFC relief from Judge Wilkinson's 
order denying motion for summary judgment. 
DATED this $J^day of October, 1993. 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
/ S j ^ E ^ y ? FERICKS 
NATHAN R. HYDE 
GERALD J. LALLATIN 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing instrument, having been executed and entered by the 
Court, has been mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, on this 
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Randall N. Skanchy, Esq. 
Deno G. Himonas, Esq. 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
1500 First Interstate Plaza 
170 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 




a successor is appointed and qualified. The presiding 
judge of the Court of Appeals shall receive as addi-
tional compensation $1,000 per annum or fraction 
thereof for the period served. 
(2) The Court of Appeals shall sit and render judg-
ment in panels of three judges. Assignment to panels 
shall be by random rotation of all judges of the Court 
of Appeals. The Court of Appeals by rule shall pro-
vide for the selection of a chair for each panel. The 
Court of Appeals may not sit en banc. 
(3) The judges of the Court of Appeals shall elect a 
presiding judge from among the members of the court 
by majority vote of all judges. The term of office of the 
presiding judge is two years and until a successor is 
elected. A presiding judge of the Court of Appeals 
may serve in that office no more than two successive 
terms. The Court of Appeals may by rule provide for 
an acting presiding judge to serve in the absence or 
incapacity of the presiding judge. 
(4) The presiding judge may be removed from the 
office of presiding judge by majority vote of all judges 
of the Court of Appeals. In addition to the duties of a 
judge of the Court of Appeals, the presiding judge 
shall: 
(a) administer the rotation and scheduling of 
panels; 
(b) act as liaison with the Supreme Court; 
(c) call and preside over the meetings of the 
Court of Appeals; and 
(d) carry out duties prescribed by the Supreme 
Court and the Judicial Council. 
(5) Fi l ing fees for the Cour t of Appeals a re t he 
same as for the Supreme Court . 1968 
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue 
all extraordinary writs and to issue ail writs and pro-
cess necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, 
and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, 
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from 
formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies 
or appeals from the district court review of infor-
mal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, ex-
cept the Public Service Commission, State Tax 
Commission, Board of State Lands, Board of Oil, 
Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of 
political subdivisions of the state or other lo-
cal agencies; and 
(ii) a challenge to agency action under 
Section 63-46a-12.1; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, except 
those from the small claims department of a cir-
cuit court; 
(e) interlocutory appeals from any court of 
record in criminal cases, except those involving a 
charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
(f) appeals from a court of record in criminal 
cases, except those involving a conviction of a 
first degree or capital felony; 
(g) appeals from orders on petitions for ex-
traordinary writs sought by persons who are in-
carcerated or serving any other criminal sen-
tence, except petitions constituting a challenge to 
a conviction of or the sentence for a first degree 
or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from the orders on petitions for ex-
traordinary writs challenging the decisions of the 
Board of Pardons except in cases involving a first 
degree or capital felony; 
(i) appeals from district court involving domes-
tic relations cases, including, but not limited to, 
divorce, annulment, property division, child cus-
tody, support, visitation, adoption, and paternity; 
(j) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
(k) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals 
from the Supreme Court. 
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only 
and by the vote of four judges of the court may certify 
to the Supreme Court for original appellate review 
and determination any matter over which the Court 
of Appeals has original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Cour t of Appeals shal l comply wi th the re-
qu i remen t s of Tit le 63, Chap te r 46b, in i ts review of 
agency adjudicative proceedings. 1992 
78-2a-4. Review of actions by Supreme Court. 
Review of the judgments, orders, and decrees of the 
Court of Appeals shall be by petition for writ of certi-
orari to the Supreme Court. 19*6 
78-2a-5. Location of Court of Appeals. 
The Court of Appeals has its principal location in 
Salt Lake City. The Court of Appeals may perform 




78-3-1 to 78-3-2. Repealed. 
78-3-3. Term of judges — Vacancy. 
78-3-4. Jurisdiction — Transfer of cases to cir-
cuit court — Appeals — Jurisdiction 
when circuit and district court 
merged. 
78-3-5. Repealed. 
78-3-6. Terms — Minimum of once quarterly. 
78-3-7 to 78-3-11. Repealed. 
78-3-11.5. State District Court Administrative 
System. 
78-3-12. Repealed. 
78-3-12.5. Costs of system. 
78-3-13. Repealed. 
78-3-13.4. Counties joining court system — Pro-
cedure — Facilities — Salaries 
78-3-13.5, 78-3-14. Repealed. 
78-3-14.5. Allocation of district court fees and 
fines. 
78-3-15 to 78-3-17. Repealed. 
78-3-17.5. Application of savings accruing to 
counties. 
78-3-18. Judicial Administration Act — Short 
title. 
78-3-19. Purpose of act. 
78-3-20. Definitions. 
78-3-21. Judicial Council — Creation — Mem-
bers — Terms and election — Re-
sponsibilities — Reports. 
78-3-21.5. Data bases for judicial boards. 
78-3-22. Presiding officer — Compensation — 
Duties. 
78-3-23. Administrator of the courts — Ap-
pointment — Qualifications — Sal-
ary. 
78-3-24. Court administrator — Powers, du-
ties, and responsibilities. 
set aside must proffer some defense of at least 
sufficient ostensible merit to justify a trial on 
that issue. Downey State Bank v. Major-
Blakeney Corp., 545 P.2d 507 (Utah 1976). 
—Setting aside proper. 
Where plaintiff served defendant with a 
summons, and left a copy with the defendant 
which was not the same as the original, the 
court had jurisdiction but sufficient confusion 
was created so that a motion to set aside the 
default judgment should have been granted 
and the defendant allowed to plead consistent 
with our declared policy that in case of uncer-
tainty, default judgments should be set aside to 
allow trial on the merits. Locke v. Peterson, 3 
Utah 2d 415, 285 P.2d 1111 (1955). 
Default judgment and writ of garnishment 
were properly set aside where trial court failed 
to obtain jurisdiction over defendant because 
summons was not timely issued. Fibreboard 
Paper Prods. Corp. v. Dietrich, 25 Utah 2d 65, 
475 P.2d 1005 (1970). 
Where appellants, plaintiffs in a civil action, 
promptly objected to date set for trial on the 
ground that their counsel had an already 
scheduled appearance in another court on that 
date, but due to fact that there were no law or 
motion days between time objection was filed 
and trial date, objection was never heard, re-
fusal to set aside default judgment entered 
when appellants failed to appear on trial date 
was an abuse of discretion. Griffiths v. Ham-
mon, 560 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1977). 
Time for appeal. 
Under former Rule 73(h) the time for appeal 
from a default judgment in a city court ran 
from the date of notice of entry of such judg-
ment, rather than from the date of judgment. 
Buckner v. Main Realty & Ins. Co., 4 Utah 2d 
124, 288 P.2d 786 (1955) (but see Central Bank 
& Trust Co. v. Jensen, supra, and Rule 58A(d)). 
Cited in Utah Sand & Gravel Prods. Corp. v. 
Tolbert, 16 Utah 2d 407, 402 P.2d 703 (1965); 
J.P.W. Enters., Inc. v. Naef, 604 P.2d 486 
(Utah 1979); Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92 (Utah 
1986). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Brigham Young Law Review. — Reason-
able Assurance of Actual Notice Required for 
In Personam Default Judgment in Utah: Gra-
ham v. Sawaya, 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 937. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments 
§§ 1152 to 1213. 
C.J.S. — 49 C.J.S. Judgments §§ 187 to 218. 
A.L.R. — Necessity of taking proof as to lia-
bility against defaulting defendant, 8 A.L.R.3d 
1070. 
Appealability of order setting aside, or refus-
ing to set aside, default judgment, 8 A.L.R.3d 
1272. 
Defaulting defendant's right to notice and 
hearing as to determination of amount of dam-
ages, 15 A.L.R.3d 586. 
Opening default or default judgment claimed 
to have been obtained because of attorney's 
mistake as to time or place of appearance, 
trial, or filing of necessary papers, 21 A.L.R.3d 
1255. 
Failure to give notice of application for de-
fault judgment where notice is required only 
by custom, 28 A.L.R.3d 1383. 
Failure of party or his attorney to appear at 
pretrial conference, 55 A.L.R.3d 303. 
Default judgments against the United States 
under Rule 55(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 55 A.L.R. Fed. 190. 
Key Numbers. — Judgment «=» 92 to 134. 
Rule 56. Summary judgment. 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or 
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the 
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of 
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any 
part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, 
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his 
favor as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least 
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the 
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be 
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in 
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a 
genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule 
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a 
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the 
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if 
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial contro-
versy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It 
shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without sub-
stantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or 
other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the 
action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be 
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Support-
ing and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set 
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirma-
tively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. 
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affida-
vit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affida-
vits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and 
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the 
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or 
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judg-
ment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
(0 When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits 
of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the 
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be 
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such 
other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of 
the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule 
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall 
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the 
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused 
him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or 
attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to Cross-References. — Contempt generally, 
Rule 56, F.R.C.P. §§ 78-7-18, 78-32-1 et seq. 






—Inconsistency with deposition. 
—Necessity of opposing affidavits. 
Resting on pleadings. 
—Objection. 
—Sufficiency. 




—Waiver of right to contest. 
—When unavailable. 
-—Exclusive control of facts. 
—Who may make. 
Affirmative defense. 
Answers to interrogatories. 
Appeal. 
—Adversely affected party. 
—Standard of review. 
Attorney's fees. 









—Weight of testimony. 
Improper party plaintiff. 
Issue of fact. 
—Corporate existence. 
—Deeds. 
—Lease as security. 
Judicial attitude. 
Motion for new trial. 
Motion to dismiss. 
Motion to reconsider. 
Notice. 
—Provision not jurisdictional. 
—Waiver of defect 
Procedural due process. 
Purpose. 
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Summary judgment improper. 
—Damage to insured vehicle. 
—Dispersal of interest. 
—Findings by court. 
—Foreclosure of trust deeds. 




—Nonspecific denial of requests for admission. 
—Note. 
—Recovery for goods and services. 
—Stock ownership. 
—Wrongful possession. 






—Res ipsa loquitur. 
Time for motion. 




Specific facts are required to show whether 
there is genuine issue for trial. Reagan Out-
door Adv., Inc. v. Lundgren, 692 P.2d 776 
(Utah 1984). 
When a motion for summary judgment is 
made under this rule, the affidavit of an ad-
verse party must contain specific evidentiary 
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for 
trial. Treloggan v. Treloggan, 699 P.2d 747 
(Utah 1985). 
—Corporation. 
Where an affidavit is made by an officer of a 
corporation, it is generally considered to be the 
affidavit of the corporation itself. However, the 
personal knowledge of an agent of the corpora-
tion who is not a corporate officer regarding 
the facts to which he has sworn will generally 
not be presumed, and therefore, the specific 
"means and sources" of his information should 
be shown. Utah Farm Prod. Credit Ass'n v. 
Watts, 737 P.2d 154 (Utah 1987). 
—Experts. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 704 allows the expert 
to state his opinion concerning the ultimate 
issue in the case, and an expert affidavit must 
also contain a sufficient factual basis for the 
opinion proffered. Thus, the affidavit is suffi-
cient if it articulates the facts upon which the 
opinion was based and if the facts were of the 
"type usually relied upon by experts in the 
field." Gaw v. State, 798 P.2d 1130 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990). 
Because the sole purpose underlying Utah R. 
Evid. 705 is to obviate the need to use hypo-
thetical questions to elicit expert opinion, the 
rule's drafters did not intend to exempt expert 
affidavits in opposition to summary judgment 
from the requirement in Subdivision (e) of this 
rule that affidavits set forth specific facts 
showing there is a genuine issue for trial; affi-
davits must include not only the expert's opin-
ion, but also the specific facts that logically 
support the expert's conclusion. Butterfield v. 
Okubo, 831 P.2d 97 (Utah 1992). 
—Inconsistency with deposition. 
Party may not rely on a subsequent affidavit 
that contradicts his deposition to create an is-
sue of fact on a motion for summary judgment 
unless there is some substantial likelihood 
that the deposition testimony was in error or 
the party-deponent is able to state in his affi-
davit an adequate explanation for the contra-
dictory answer in his deposition. Webster v. 
Sill, 675 P.2d 1170 (Utah 1983); Gaw v. State, 
798 P.2d 1130 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
—Necessity of opposing affidavits. 
A plaintiff opposing a motion for summary 
judgment is not required to file opposing affi-
davits but may stand upon his pleadings pro-
vided that his allegations, if proved, would es-
tablish a basis for recovery. Christensen ex rel. 
Christensen v. Financial Serv. Co., 14 Utah 2d 
101, 377 P.2d 1010 (1963). 
Where a defendant's motion for summary 
judgment is based solely on his pleadings and 
is not made and supported by affidavits, as pro-
vided in Subdivision (c), plaintiff, pursuant to 
Subdivision (e), may rest on the allegations in 
his pleadings. Parrish v. Layton City Corp., 
542 P.2d 1086 (Utah 1975). 
Fact that party opposed to the motion for 
summary judgment fails to submit documents 
in opposition does not preclude the denial of 
the motion; where the party opposed submits 
no documents in opposition, the moving party 
may be granted summary judgment only if ap-
propriate, that is, he is entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law. Olwell v. Clark, 658 P.2d 585 
(Utah 1982). 
When a party opposes a properly supported 
motion for summary judgment and fails to file 
any responsive affidavits or other evidentiary 
materials allowed by Subdivision (e), the trial 
court may properly conclude that there are no 
genuine issues of fact unless the face of the 
movant's affidavit affirmatively discloses the 
existence of such an issue. Franklin Fin. v. 
New Empire Dev. Co., 659 P.2d 1040 (Utah 
1983); Cowen & Co. v. Atlas Stock Transf. Co., 
695 P.2d 109 (Utah 1984); Busch Corp. v. State 
Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 743 P.2d 1217 (Utah 
1987). 
Summary judgment need not be affirmed 
merely because party opposing summary judg-
ment did not file affidavits in order to avoid 
judgment against him. Mountain States Tel. & 
Tel. Co. v. Atkin, Wright & Miles, Chartered, 
681 P.2d 1258 (Utah 1984). 
When read in light of Subdivision (b), it is 
clear that the Subdivision (e) requirement that 
a party opposing the summary judgment mo-
tion file counter-affidavits applies only when 
the moving party has elected to and has filed 
affidavits in support of the motion. If the mov-
ing party chooses not to or simply fails to file 
affidavits, Subdivision (e) is inapplicable. Gadd 
v. Olson, 685 P.2d 1041 (Utah 1984). 
When a motion for summary judgment is 
filed and supported by an affidavit, the party 
opposing the motion has an affirmative duty to 
respond with affidavits or other materials al-
lowed by Subdivision (e). D & L Supply v. 
Saurini, 775 P.2d 420 (Utah 1989). 
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Resting on pleadings. 
When adequate proof is submitted in support 
of a motion for summary judgment, the plead-
ings are not sufficient to raise an issue of fact 
Dupier v Yates, 10 Utah 2d 251, 351 P 2d 624 
(1960) 
An unverified amendment of a pleading 
should not be allowed to defeat a motion for 
summary judgment if the amendment does not 
effect any substantial change m the issues as 
they were originally formulated in the plead-
ings Dupier v Yates 10 Utah 2d 251 351 P 2d 
624 (1960) 
In view of 1965 amendment to this rule it 
was proper to grant summary judgment for 
plaintiff upon facts given by defendant in his 
deposition defendant could not rely upon alle-
gations in pleading to create issue of fact 
United Am Life Ins Co v Willey, 21 Utah 2d 
279, 444 P2d 755 (1968) 
A party may not rely upon allegations in the 
pleadings to counter affidavits made upon per-
sonal knowledge stating facts contrary to those 
alleged in the pleadings Freed Fin Co v 
Stoker Motor Co , 537 P 2d 1039 (Utah 1975) 
A defendant cannot rely upon the mere alle-
gations or denials of her pleadings to avoid a 
summary judgment but must set forth specific 
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for 
trial Thornock v Cook, 604 P 2d 934 (Utah 
1979) 
Allegations or denials in the pleadings are 
not a sufficient basis for opposing summary 
judgment Hall v Fitzgerald 671 P2d 224 
(Utah 1983) 
—Objection. 
Because the defendants' objection to the 
plaintiffs first affidavit was framed as a sepa-
rate, written motion to strike, the plaintiff 
should have been given ten days to respond, as 
prescribed by Utah Code Jud Admin 
4 501(l)(b) Gillmor v Cummings, 806 P2d 
1205 (Utah Ct App 1991) 
—Sufficiency. 
In order for an affidavit to be of effective use 
in the determination of a motion for summary 
judgment, it must set forth such facts as would 
be admissible in evidence Preston v Lamb, 20 
Utah 2d 260, 436 P 2d 1021 (1968), Norton v 
Blackham 669 P 2d 857 (Utah 1983) 
An affidavit in opposition to motion for sum-
mary judgment to be effective must set forth 
such facts as are admissible in evidence, thus 
affidavit consisting of inadmissible parol evi-
dence used for purpose of varying terms of 
written agreement was ineffective Rainford v 
Rytting, 22 Utah 2d 252, 451 P 2d 769 (1969) 
An affidavit that does not meet the require-
ment! of this rule is subject to motion to strike 
Howick v Bank of Salt Lake, 28 Utah 2d 64, 
498 P2d 352 (1972) 
In consideration of a motion for summary 
judgment, answers to interrogatories incorpo-
rated by reference into an affidavit in support 
of the motion are subject to the rules of evi-
dence Humphries v Remco, Inc , 30 Utah 2d 
348, 517 P2d 1309 (1974) 
Affidavits in support of or opposition to a mo-
tion for summary judgment are admissible un-
less they are not made on personal knowledge, 
their contents would not be admissible in evi-
dence or the affiant was not competent to tes-
tify Strange v Ostlund, 594 P 2d 877 (Utah 
1979), Treloggan v Treloggan, 699 P 2d 747 
(Utah 1985) 
Employee claiming he was fired in retalia-
tion for whistle-blowing failed to raise a genu-
ine issue of material fact as to his wrongful 
termination because he did not produce evi-
dence of actual safety violations but relied only 
on his own unsupported conclusions Winter v 
Northwest Pipeline Corp , 820 P 2d 916 (Utah 
1991) 
Hearsay and opinion testimony 
Hearsay testimony and opinion testimony 
that would not be admissible if testified to at 
the trial may not properly be set forth in an 
affidavit supporting a summary judgment 
Western States Thrift & Loan Co v 
Blomquist, 29 Utah 2d 58, 504 P2d 1019 
(1972), Walker v Rocky Mt Recreation Corp , 
29 Utah 2d 274, 508 P 2d 538 (1973) 
An affidavit that merely reflects the affida-
vit's unsubstantiated conclusions and that fails 
to state evidentiary facts is insufficient to cre-
ate an issue of fact Walker v Rocky Mt Recre-
ation Corp, 29 Utah 2d 274, 508 P2d 538 
(1973), Williams v Melby, 699 P 2d 723 (Utah 
1985) 
Statements in an affidavit that are largely 
conclusory in form, and would not be admissi-
ble in evidence, may not be considered on mo-
tion for summary judgment under Subdivision 
(e) Norton v Blackham, 669 P 2d 857 (Utah 
1983) 
A supporting affidavit must be based on the 
affiant's personal knowledge, and an affidavit 
based merely on his unsubstantiated opinions 
and beliefs is insufficient Treloggan v 
Treloggan, 699 P 2d 747 (Utah 1985) 
—Superseding pleadings. 
As against general allegations of negligence 
contained in the complaint, facts set out in affi-
davits cannot be construed as totally supersed-
ing the pleadings Lundberg v Backman, 9 
Utah 2d 58, 337 P2d 433 (1959) 
—Unpleaded defenses. 
Defenses not raised by the answer or by 
proper motion may not be raised in an affidavit 
in opposition to a motion for summary judg-
ment Valley Bank & Trust Co v Wilken, 668 
P 2d 493 (Utah 1983) 
—Verified pleading. 
A plaintiffs verified pleading that meets the 
requirements for affidavits can be considered 
the equivalent of an affidavit for the purpose of 
defeating a motion for summary judgment 
Pentecost v Harward, 699 P 2d 696 (Utah 
1985) 
—Waiver of right to contest. 
Formal or evidentiary defects in an affidavit 
in support of or opposition to a motion for sum-
mary judgment are waived in the absence of a 
motion to strike or other objection Fox v All-
state Ins Co, 22 Utah 2d 383, 453 P 2d 701 
(1969), Howick v Bank of Salt Lake, 28 Utah 
2d 64, 498 P 2d 352 (1972), Strange v Ostlund, 
594 P 2d 877 (Utah 1979), Franklin Fin v 
New Empire Dev Co, 659 P 2d 1040 (Utah 
1983), Hobelman Motors, Inc v Allred, 685 
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P 2d 544 (Utah 1984); Salt Lake City Corp. v. 
James Constructors, Inc., 761 P.2d 42 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988). 
Where verified pleadings did not satisfy the 
criteria of Subdivision (e), but neither party 
objected to the form or the content of the 
other's verified pleading and/or affidavit and 
the trial court apparently raised no objections 
sua sponte, any evidentiary objections were 
deemed to be waived and the verified com-
plaint was held sufficient to controvert the affi-
davit for purposes of avoiding summary judg-
ment. Pentecost v Harward, 699 P 2d 696 
(Utah 1985). 
Defendant waived evidentiary errors in 
plaintiffs affidavit and in the recitation of sup-
posedly uncontested facts in plaintiffs memo-
randum of points when he failed to object at 
the tnal court. D & L Supply v. Saunm, 775 
P 2d 420 (Utah 1989). 
—When unavailable. 
In libel action against student newspaper 
published at state university, where defense 
counsel presented affidavit asserting that 
newspaper was a university-controlled entity 
protected by doctrine of sovereign immunity, 
and plaintiff's counsel in reply four days later 
stated that he was unable to respond to defen-
dant's contention due to lack of discovery, such 
a reply was sufficient under this subdivision to 
invoke the trial court's discretion, and it was 
an abuse of that discretion to enter summary 
judgment for defendant without granting 
plaintiff additional time for discovery. Strand 
v. Associated Students of Univ. of Utah, 561 
P.2d 191 (Utah 1977). 
Where investors sued attorney and his client 
with regard to funds lost in investment ven-
ture, the trial court erred in granting motion 
for summary judgment against them without 
allowing them additional time to gather facts 
necessary to refute allegations in defendant's 
affidavit. Cox v. Winters, 678 P2d 311 (Utah 
1984) 
Where the party opposing summary judg-
ment had initiated discovery prior to the filing 
of the summary judgment motion and received 
no response, the trial court should, under Sub-
division (f) of this rule, postpone its decision 
pending the completion of such discovery. Cox 
v. Winters, 678 P.2d 311 (Utah 1984). 
Plaintiffs' Rule 56(f) motion for continuance 
was properly denied because they did not file 
accompanying affidavits specifying the facts 
they believed further discovery would produce 
to defeat defendant's motion. Callioux v. Pro-
gressive Ins. Co., 745 P 2d 838 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987). 
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
denying plaintiff's request for a continuance 
under Subdivision (f), where counsel's affidavit 
asserted merely that she had not had adequate 
time to conduct sufficient discovery and secure 
expert affidavits opposing those of respondents, 
and did not describe the type of additional dis-
covery needed or the time necessary to com-
plete it. Reeves v. Geigy Pharmaceutical, Inc., 
764 P.2d 636 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
To determine whether an affidavit is suffi-
cient to merit a Subdivision (f) continuance, 
several factors should be consiiieied IIJ Lin 
reasons articulated in the Rule 56(f) affidavit 
must be "adequate" and the party against 
whom summary judgment is sought should not 
be merely on a "fishing expedition" for purely 
speculative facts; (2) there must have been suf-
ficient time since the inception of the lawsuit 
for the party against whom the summary judg-
ment is sought to use discovery procedures, 
and thereby cross-examine the moving party; 
and (3) if discovery procedures were timely ini-
tiated, the nonmoving party must have been 
afforded an appropriate response. Sandy City 
v Salt Lake County, 794 P.2d 482 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 827 P 2d 
212 (Utah 1992); Jones v. Bountiful City Corp 
834 P 2d 556 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) 
Subdivision (0 motions should be granted 
liberally to provide adequate opportunity for 
discovery, because information gained during 
discovery may create genuine issues of fact suf-
ficient to defeat a motion for summary judg-
ment. However, courts should not grant such 
motions when the party is dilatory or the argu-
ments are lacking in merit. Sandy City v Salt 
Lake County, 794 P.2d 482 (Utah Ct. App 
1990), rev'd on other grounds, 827 P 2d 212 
(Utah 1992). 
Exclusive control of facts. 
In a Subdivision (f) motion, the mere aver 
ment of exclusive knowledge or control of the^  
facts by the moving party is not adequate: the 
opposing party must show to the best of his 
ability what facts are within the movant's ex-
clusive knowledge or control; what steps have 
been taken to obtain the desired information 
pursuant to discovery procedures under the 
rules; and that he is desirous of taking advan-
tage of these discovery procedures. Sandy Cit\ 
v. Salt Lake County, 794 P.2d 482 (Utah Ct 
App. 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 827 P id 
212 (Utah 1992). 
—Who may make. 
Any witness, not just a party, who has 
knowledge of the facts can make an affidavit as 
to material facts. Western Pac. Transp. Co \ 
Beehive State Agric Coop., 597 P.2d 854 (Utah 
1979). 
Affirmative defense. 
Summary judgment may be based on an at 
firmative defense, such as a valid release, that 
would defeat the cause of action. Ulibarri \ 
Christenson, 2 Utah 2d 367, 275 P 2d m 
(1954). 
Answers to interrogatories. 
This rule must be considered together with 
Rule 56(e); thus answers to interrogatories 
based on self-serving hearsay and conclusion ^  
are not sufficient to show genuine issue of nr i-
tenal fact necessary to prevent summary judg-
ment. A & M Enters., Inc. v. Hunziker 25 
Utah 2d 363, 482 P.2d 700 (1971). 
While Subdivision (c) allows consideration oi 
answers to interrogatories on a motion for 
summary judgment, evidence considered must 
be observations made on personal knowledge 
or it will be declared incompetent and of no 
weight. A & M Enters., Inc. v. Hunziker, 25 
Utah 2d 363, 482 P.2d 700 fl971). 
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Appeal. 
Where the only controversy brought by the 
parties was the interpretation of a writing and 
both parties placed the question in the hands of 
the court by making mutual motions for sum-
mary judgment, the losing party was not enti-
tled to a trial on the facts after the court made 
its decision. Mastic Tile Div. of Ruberoid Co. v. 
Acme Distrib. Co., 15 Utah 2d 136, 389 P.2d 56 
(1964). 
On review of a grant of summary judgment 
to a plaintiff, the inquiry is whether there is 
any genuine issue as to any material fact, and 
if there is not, whether the plaintiffs are enti-
tled to judgment as a matter of law. Thornock 
v. Cook, 604 P.2d 934 (Utah 1979). 
Where a party pursues a motion for sum-
mary judgment on one claim, he may not, on 
appeal, either justify the grant of such motion 
or challenge its denial on the basis of a sepa-
rate and distinct claim. L & A Drywall, Inc. v. 
Whitmore Constr. Co., 608 P.2d 626 (Utah 
1980). 
A challenge to a summary judgment 
presents for review only conclusions of law be-
cause, by definition, cases decided on summary 
judgment do not resolve factual disputes. 
Schurtz v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 814 P.2d 1108 
(Utah 1991). 
In appeal from summary judgment, court re-
fused to consider arguments that were not 
raised before the trial court. Olson v. Park-
Craig-Olson, Inc., 815 P.2d 1356 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1991). 
—Adversely affected party. 
Recognizing that the party adversely af-
fected by the summary judgment has not had 
an opportunity for trial, the court views the 
facts in the light most favorable to that party. 
When summary judgment is granted, the party 
adversely affected is the party who did not 
move for summary judgment. If summary judg-
ment is denied on the merits and a claim or 
defense of the movant thereby eliminated, then 
the facts are viewed in the light most favorable 
to the moving party. Estate Landscape & Snow 
Removal Specialists, Inc. v. Mountain States 
Tel. & Tel. Co., 793 P.2d 415 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990). 
—Standard of review. 
On review of a summary judgment or a mo-
tion on the pleadings treated as a motion for 
summary judgment under Rule 12(c), the party 
against whom the judgment has been granted 
is entitled to have all the facts presented, and 
all the inferences fairly arising therefrom, con-
sidered in a light most favorable to him. Morris 
v. Farnsworth Motel, 123 Utah 289, 259 P.2d 
297 (1953); Young v. Texas Co., 8 Utah 2d 206, 
331 P.2d 1099 (1958); Brandt v. Springville 
Banking Co., 10 Utah 2d 350, 353 P.2d 460 
(1960); Bridge v. Backman, 10 Utah 2d 366, 
353 P.2d 909 (1960); Allen's Prods. Co. v. 
Glover, 18 Utah 2d 9, 414 P>2d 93 (1966); Pio-
neer Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Pioneer Fin. & 
Thrift Co., 18 Utah 2d 106, 417 P.2d 121 
(1966); Geneva Pipe Co. v. S & H Ins. Co., 714 
P2d648 (Utah 1986); Thompson v. Ford Motor 
Co., 16 Utah 2d 30, 395 P.2d 62 (1964); 
Whitman v. W.T. Grant Co., 16 Utah 2d 81, 
395 P.2d 918 (1964); English v. Kienke, 774 
P.2d 1154 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, granted, 779 
P.2d 688 (Utah 1989); Mountain States Tel. & 
Tel. Co. v. Garfield County, 811 P.2d 184 (Utah 
1991); Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104 
(Utah 1991). 
Upon review of a grant of a motion for sum-
mary judgment, the Supreme Court applies the 
same standard as that applied by the trial 
court. Durham v. Margetts, 571 P.2d 1332 
(Utah 1977); Briggs v. Holcomb, 740 P.2d 281 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
Because disposition of a case on summary 
judgment denies the benefit of a trial on the 
merits, the appellate court must review the ev-
idence in the light most favorable to the losing 
party, and affirms only where it appears there 
is no genuine dispute as to any material issues 
of fact, or where, even according to the facts as 
contended by the losing party, the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. Themy v. Seagull Enters., Inc., 595 P.2d 
526 (Utah 1979); Briggs v. Holcomb, 740 P.2d 
281 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); Copper State Leas-
ing Co. v. Blacker Appliance & Furn. Co., 770 
P.2d 88 (Utah 1988); Reeves v. Geigy Pharma-
ceutical, Inc., 764 P.2d 636 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988); Hunt v. ESI Eng'g, Inc., 808 P.2d 1137 
(Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 826 P.2d 651 
(Utah 1991). 
Since a summary judgment is granted as a 
matter of law rather than fact, the appellate 
court is free to reappraise the trial court's legal 
conclusions. Barber v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 751 
P.2d 248 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Winegar v. 
Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104 (Utah 1991). 
Inasmuch as a challenge to summary judg-
ment presents for review conclusions of law 
only, because, by definition, summary judg-
ments do not resolve factual issues, the appel-
late court reviews those conclusions for correct-
ness, without according deference to the trial 
court's legal conclusions. Bonham v. Morgan, 
788 P.2d 497 (Utah 1989); Daniels v. Deseret 
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 771 P.2d 1100 (Utah 
Ct. App.), cert, denied, 783 P.2d 53 (Utah 
1989); Transamerica Cash Reserve, Inc. v. 
Dixie Power & Water, Inc., 789 P.2d 24 (1990); 
Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Garfield 
County, 811 P.2d 184 (Utah 1991). 
If a contract is ambiguous and the trial court 
makes findings of fact from extrinsic evidence, 
the appellate court's review is strictly limited. 
However, if the contract is ambiguous but the 
case is decided on summary judgment, the ap-
pellate court can affirm only if the undisputed 
material facts concerning the parties' intent 
demonstrate that the successful litigant's posi-
tion is correct as a matter of law. Fashion Place 
Inv., Ltd. v. Salt Lake County/Salt Lake 
County Mental Health, 776 P.2d 941 (Utah Ct. 
App.), cert, denied, 783 P.2d 53 (Utah 1989). 
In considering an appeal from a grant of 
summary judgment, the appellate court views 
the facts in a light most favorable to the losing 
party below. And in determining whether 
those facts require, as a matter of law, the 
entry of judgment for the prevailing party be-
low, the appellate court gives no deference to 
the trial court's conclusions of law, which are 
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reviewed for correctness Blue Cross & Blue 
Shield v State, 779 P 2d 634 (Utah 1989) 
An appellate court accords no deference to a 
trial court's legal conclusions given to support 
the grant of summary judgment but reviews 
them for correctness Schurtz v BMW of N 
Am, Inc, 814 P2d 1108 (Utah 1991) 
In determining whether the trial court cor 
rectly found that there were no genuine issues 
of material fact, the appellate court views the 
facts and all reasonable inferences in a light 
most favorable to the party opposing the mo-
tion It reviews the tnal court's conclusions of 
law for correctness, including its conclusion 
that there are no material fact issues 
Neiderhauser Bldrs & Dev Corp v Campbell, 
824 P2d 1193 (Utah H ^pp 1992) 
Attorney's fees. 
Where attorney's fees are awarded to a pre 
vailing party on summary judgment the un 
disputed, material facts must establish as a 
matter of law, that (1) the party is entitled to 
the award and (2) the amount awarded is rea-
sonable Taylor v Estate of Taylor 770 P 2d 
163 Utah Ct App 1989) 
Availability of motion 
The remedy of summary judgment is avail 
able to both the plaintiff and the defendant, on 
the original action or counterclaims National 
Am Life Ins Co v Bayou Country Club Inc , 
16 Utah 2d 417, 403 P2d 26 (1965) 
Summary judgment on a complaint is not 
precluded by the existence of a counterclaim 
Bennion v Amoss 28 Utah 2d 216 500 P 2d 
512 (1972) 
Cross-motions. 
When both parties move for summary judg 
ment the court is not bound to grant it to one 
side or another Diamond T Utah Inc v Trav-
elers Indem Co 21 Utah 2d 124 441 P 2d 705 
(1968) 
Cross-motions for summary judgment do not 
warrant the court's granting of summary judg-
ment unless one of the moving parties is enti-
tled to judgment as a matter of law upon facts 
that are not genuinely disputed Amjacs 
Interwest, Inc v Design Assocs, 635 P 2d 53 
(Utah 1981) 
Cross-motions may be viewed as involving a 
contention by each movant that no genuine is-
sue of fact exists under the theory it advances, 
but not as a concession that no dispute remains 
under the theory advanced by its adversary In 
effect, each cross-movant implicitly contends 
that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law, but that if the court determines otherwise, 
factual disputes exist that preclude judgment 
as a matter of law in favor of the other side 
Wycalis v Guardian Title, 780 P 2d 821 (Utah 
Ct App 1989), cert denied 789 P 2d 33 (Utah 
1990) 
Damages. 
Defendant s failure to oppose plaintiffs mo-
tion for partial summary judgment in an action 
for legal malpractice was a capitulation only 
on the question of whether there was a genuine 
issue of material fact with respect to his breach 
of duty, and granting judgment did not relieve 
plaintiff of the obligation to prove any damages 
he sustained that were proximately caused by 
defendants negligence William.-. I LIIJI 
765 P2d 887 (Utah 1988) 
Discovery. 
Generally, summary judgment should not be 
granted if discovery is incomplete, since infor-
mation sought in discovery may create genuine 
issues of material fact sufficient to defeat the 
motion Downtown Athletic Club v Horman, 
740 P 2d 275 (Utah Ct App t rert denied 765 
P2d 1277 (1987) 
District court properly denied plaintiffs mo-
tions to compel further deposing of defendant 
and to continue the summary judgment hear 
ing where plaintiffs counsel was simply on a 
"fishing expedition for purely speculative 
facts after substantial discovery had been con-
ducted without producing any significant evi 
dence Downtown Athletic Club / Horman 
740 P 2d 275 (Utah Ct App ) cert denied "65 
P2d 1277 (1987) 
Disputed facts 
Where disputed facts would not e&tabhah a 
basis upon which plaintiff could recover no 
matter how they were resolved, it * on Id have 
been useless to try them and ad i 11 >n a 
summary judgment was proper Abdulkadir v 
Western Pac R R , 7 Utah 2d 53, 318 P 2d 339 
(1957) 
On a motion for summary judgment against 
a defendant, where some of the facts are in 
dispute, a judgment can properly be rendered 
against him only if, on the undisputed fact*? 
the defendant has no valid defense Disai i I 
Am Veterans v Hendnxson 9 Utah 2d 
340 P2d 416 (1959) 
Summary judgment cannot 
granted if the allegations of the p 
plaint stand in opposition to the 
the affidavits so that there art 
issues of fact, the determinatioi 
necessary to settle the rights of t; 
Chnstensen ex rel Chnstensen v 
Serv Co, 14 Utah 2d 101, 377 
(1963) 
It only takes one sworn statement to dispute 
averments on other side of controversy and cre-
ate issue of fact, precluding summary judg-
ment Holbrook Co v Adams 542 P 2d 191 
(Utah 1975) 
The presence of a dispute as to material facts 
disallows the granting of a summary judg-
ment Bill Brown Realty, Inc v Abbott 562 
P 2d 238 (Utah 1977) 
Where the parties were not m complete con-
flict as to certain facts, but the understanding, 
intention, and consequences of those facts were 
vigorously disputed, the matter was not proper 
for summary judgment and could onlv be re-
solved by a trial Sandberg v Klein 576 P 2d 
1291 (Utah 1978) 
Summary judgment is not precluded simply 
whenever some fact remains in dispute, but 
only when a material fact is genuinely contro-
verted Heglar Ranch, Inc v Stillman 619 
P2d 1390 (Utah 1980) 
Evidence. 
In case of motion for summary judgment the 
adverse party is entitled to have the court sur-
vey the evidence and all reasonable inferences 
fairly to be drawn therefrom in the light most 
favorable to him. Morris v. Farnsworth Motel, 
123 Utah 289, 259 P.2d 297 (1953); Thompson 
v. Ford Motor Co., 16 Utah 2d 30, 395 P.2d 62 
(1964); Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434 
(Utah 1982). 
Where trial court granted defendant's mo-
tion for summary judgment on the ground that 
the plaintiffs own statement in his deposition 
showed that plaintiff was contributorily negli-
gent in causing his injuries, on appeal by 
plaintiff, contesting that ruling, Supreme 
Court was obliged to consider the evidence in 
the light most favorable to plaintiff. Whitman 
v. W.T. Grant Co., 16 Utah 2d 81, 395 P.2d 918 
(1964). 
Submissions in support of or opposition to a 
motion for summary judgment should be 
looked at in the light favorable to the nonmov-
ing party's position. Durham v. Margetts, 571 
P.2d 1332 (Utah 1977); Salt Lake City Corp. v. 
James Constructors, Inc., 761 P.2d 42 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988). 
Because disposition of a case by summary 
judgment denies the benefit of a trial on the 
merits, any doubt concerning questions of fact, 
including evidence and reasonable inferences 
drawn from the evidence, should be resolved in 
favor of the party opposing the motion. Beehive 
Brick Co. v. Robinson Brick Co., 780 P.2d 827 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
—Facts considered. 
In ruling on a motion for a summary judg-
ment, the court may consider only facts that 
are not in dispute. Sorenson v. Beers, 585 P.2d 
458 (Utah 1978). 
—Improper evidence. 
Where summary judgment is granted, there 
has been no hearing and no evidence has been 
viewed by the court and, therefore, no appeal 
may be made on the basis of improper evi-
dence. Burningham v. Ott, 525 P.2d 620 (Utah 
1974). 
—Proof.' 
The quantum of proof to show nonexistence 
of a material fact is of necessity less than that 
required to prove a matter of affirmative de-
fense. Dupler v. Yates, 10 Utah 2d 251, 351 
P.2d 624 (1960). 
—Weight of testimony. 
Court cannot consider weight of testimony or 
credibility of witnesses on motion for summary 
judgment; court simply determines that there 
is no disputed issue of material fact and that as 
matter of law one party should prevail. Single-
ton v. Alexander, 19 Utah 2d 292, 431 P.2d 126 
(1967); Sandberg v. Klein, 576 P.2d 1291 (Utah 
1978). 
Summary judgment is never used to deter-
mine what the facts are, but only to ascertain 
whether there are any material issues of fact 
in dispute. Hill ex rel. Fogel v. Grand Cent., 
Inc., 25 Utah 2d 121, 477 P.2d 150 (1970). 
On a motion for summary judgment, it is not 
Appropriate for a court to weigh disputed evi-
dence concerning such factors; the sole inquiry 
to be determined is whether there is a material 
issue of fact to be decided. W.M. Barnes Co. v. 
Sohio Natural Resources Co., 627 P.2d 56 
(Utah 1981); Spor v. Crested Butte Silver Min-
ing, Inc., 740 P.2d 1304 (Utah 1987). 
Improper party plaintiff. 
Summary judgment against husband suing 
for damages occasioned by alleged negligent 
injury to wife was sustained since wife rather 
than husband was proper party to sue for dam-
ages claimed. Corbridge v. Morrin & Son, 19 
Utah 2d 409, 432 P.2d 41 (1967). 
Issue of fact 
A genuine issue of fact exists where, on the 
basis of the facts in the record, reasonable 
minds could differ on whether defendant's con-
duct measures up to the required standard. 
Jackson v. Dabney, 645 P.2d 613 (Utah 1982). 
In order for nonmoving party to oppose suc-
cessfully a motion for summary judgment and 
send the issue to a fact-finder, it is not neces-
sary for the party to prove its legal theory; it is 
only necessary for nonmoving party to show 
"facts" controverting the "facts" stated in mov-
ing party's affidavit. Salt Lake City Corp. v. 
James Constructors, Inc., 761 P.2d 42 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988). 
—Corporate existence. 
Where an issue of fact was raised as to 
whether plaintiff veterans' organization was a 
corporation having a right to institute suit in 
its own name under Rule 17(d), or was in fact a 
voluntary unincorporated association, a sum-
mary judgment against the defendant non-
profit corporation was precluded on this point. 
Disabled Am. Veterans v. Hendrixson, 9 Utah 
2d 152, 340 P.2d 416 (1959). 
—Deeds. 
Presumptive validity of deeds created issues 
of fact which precluded summary judgment for 
plaintiffs attacking deeds. Judkins v. Toone, 27 
Utah 2d 17, 492 P.2d 980 (1972). 
—Lease as security. 
Whether a lease was intended as security for 
a sale is a question to be determined on the 
facts of each case, as is the issue of whether the 
nature of the document raises questions of fact 
that preclude summary judgment. Colonial 
Leasing Co. v. Larsen Bros. Constr. Co., 731 
P.2d 483 (Utah 1986). 
Judicial attitude. 
Because a summary judgment prevents liti-
gants from fully presenting their case to the 
court, courts are, and should be, reluctant to 
invoke this remedy. Brandt v. Springville 
Banking Co., 10 Utah 2d 350, 353 P.2d 460 
(1960). 
Motion for new trial. 
A motion for a "new" trial following sum-
mary judgment is procedurally correct and 
available to litigants. Moon Lake Elec. Ass'n v. 
Ultrasystems W. Constructors, Inc., 767 P.2d 
125 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
Filing of an "exception to order and motion 
for reconsideration" of summary judgment 
tolled the thirty-day time period within which 
to file a notice of appeal, notwithstanding the 
incorrect title placed upon the pleading, where 
the judge ruled on the motion as if it were a 
motion for a new trial. Watkiss & Campbell v. 
Foa & Son, 808 P.2d 1061 (Utah 1991). 
Motion to dismiss. 
Where, in an action based on an alleged con-
tract, the parties have stipulated all of the evi-
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dence, and the defendant moves for dismissal 
of the action on the ground that, as a matter of 
law, the evidence shows no meeting of the 
minds, the motion is really a motion for a sum-
mary judgment, and can be granted only if 
there is no evidence from which it would be 
reasonable to find that there was a meeting of 
the minds. R.J. Daum Constr. Co. v. Child, 122 
Utah 194, 247 P.2d 817 (1952). 
In denying defendant's motion to dismiss li-
bel complaint for failure to state a claim, trial 
court acted improperly in demanding that 
plaintiff produce evidence to support her alle-
gation of malice and in entering a summary 
judgment for defendant on her failure to do so, 
since the court on its own initiative should not 
try to convert a motion for dismissal into one 
for summary judgment. Hill v. Grand Cent., 
Inc., 25 Utah 2d 121, 477 P.2d 150 (1970). 
Motion to reconsider. 
Court properly refused to reconsider when 
the party seeking reconsideration did not 
present any legal theories that had not already 
been considered and, although it elaborated on 
some facts, it presented no material facts that 
had not been before the court at the time of the 
original decision to grant summary judgment. 
Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors, 
Inc., 761 P.2d 42 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
Notice. 
A summary judgment is proper even in the 
absence of any formal notice by the moving 
party when it appears there are no true factual 
issues and the court can resolve the remaining 
determination of questions of law. Security Ti-
tle Co. v. Payless Bldrs. Supply, 17 Utah 2d 
179, 407 P.2d 141 (1965). 
Where a party cannot prove that his righto 
were adversely affected, an appellate court will 
uphold a summary judgment granted at a 
hearing held less than 10 days after service of 
the notice of, and motion for, a summary judg-
ment. Western States Thrift & Loan Co. v. 
Blomquist, 29 Utah 2d 58, 504 P.2d 1019 
(1972). 
—Provision not jurisdictional. 
Trial court did not lack jurisdiction to render 
summary judgment where notice of the motion 
was mailed only nine days prior to the hearing 
but defendants were present at the hearing; 
notice provision of this rule is not jurisdic-
tional. Walker v. Rocky Mt. Recreation Corp., 
29 Utah 2d 274, 508 P.2d 538 (1973). 
Because a violation of the notice require-
ment of Subdivision (c) does not divest the 
court of jurisdiction over the motion, it has the 
power to grant summary judgment despite 
such a violation. However, such a violation will 
void the grant unless the violation amounts to 
harmless error. Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 
817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991) 
—Waiver of defect. 
Where defendant failed to object in the trial 
court to the fact that a notice of a motion for 
summary judgment was mailed only nine days 
prior to the hearing, any defect was deemed to 
have been waived. Walker v. Rocky Mt. Recre-
ation Corp,, 29 Utah 2d 274, 508 P.2d 538 
(1973). 
Procedural due process. 
Defendant was not denied procedural due 
process on ground that it did not have reason-
able opportunity to prepare for trial and en-
gage in discovery procedures despite fact that 
only 13 days lapsed between the mailing of de-
fendant's answer and the filing of plaintiffs 
motion for summary judgment. Walker v. 
Rocky Mt. Recreation Corp., 29 Utah 2d 274, 
508 P.2d 538 (1973). 
Purpose. 
The primary purpose of the summary judg-
ment procedure is to pierce the allegations of 
the pleadings, to show that there is no genuine 
issue of material fact, although an issue may 
be raised by the pleadings, and to establish 
that the moving party is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law. Dupler v, Yates, 10 Utah 2d 
251, 351 P.2d 624 (1960). 
The sole purpose of summary judgment is to 
bar from the courts unnecessary and unjusti-
fied litigation. Reliable Furn. Co. v. Fidelity & 
Guar. Ins. Underwriters, 16 Utah 2d 211, 398 
P.2d 685 (1965). 
A motion for summary judgment provides a 
means for searching out the undisputed facts 
as shown by the pleadings, depositions, admis-
sions, answers to interrogatories and docu-
ments before the court; its aim is to discover 
whether a controversy can be settled as a mat-
ter of law, thereby saving both court and liti-
gants the time, trouble and expense of a trial; 
but because the party against whom a sum-
mary judgment is entered is deprived of the 
privilege of a trial, the record must be carefully 
scrutinized to see if that party presents allega-
tions which, if true, would entitle him to judg-
ment; if so, then summary judgment is im-
proper. Rich v. McGovern, 551 P.2d 1266 (Utah 
1976). 
In circumstances where the granting of a 
motion for summary dismissal is justified, it 
serves the salutary purpose of eliminating the 
time, trouble and expense of a trial that would 
be to no avail anyway. McBride v. Jones, 615 
P.2d 431 (Utah 1980). 
A major purpose of summary judgment is to 
avoid unnecessary trial by allowing the parties 
to pierce the pleadings to determine whether 
there is a genuine issue to present to the fact 
finder. Reagan Outdoor Adv., Inc. v. Lundgren, 
692 P.2d 776 (Utah 1984). 
Summary judgment improper. 
If there is any genuine issue as to any mate 
rial fact, the motion should be denied. Young v. 
Felornia, 121 Utah 646, 244 P.2d 862, cert, de-
nied, 344 U.S. 886, 73 S. Ct. 186, 97 L. Ed. 685 
(1952); Ruffinengo v. Miller, 579 P.2d 342 
(Utah 1978). 
Unless there is a showing that the disfavored 
parties cannot produce evidence that would 
reasonably support a finding in their favor on a 
material or determinative issue of fact, a sum-
mary judgment is erroneous. Bridge v. 
Backman, 10 Utah 2d 366, 353 P.2d 909 
(1960); Kranto v. Holt, 819 P.2d 352 (Utah 
1991); Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. Co., 819 
P.2d 803 (Utah 1991). 
Summary judgment was erroneously entered 
for plaintiff where issue of fact was raised by 
pleadings and counteraffidavit of defendant. 
Hatch v. Sugarhouse Fin. Co., 20 Utah 2d 156, 
434 P.2d 758 (1967). 
Bare contentions, unsupported by any speci-
fication of facts in support thereof, raise no ma-
terial questions of fact to preclude the entry of 
summary judgment. Massey v, Utah Power & 
Light, 609 P.2d 937 (Utah 1980). 
A motion for summary judgment should be 
denied where the evidence presents a genuine 
issue of material fact which, if resolved in fa-
vor of the nonmoving party, would entitle him 
to judgment as a matter of law. Jackson v. 
Dabney, 645 P.2d 613 (Utah 1982). 
Summary judgment is appropriate only 
when no genuine issue of material fact exists 
and the moving party is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law. Ehlers & Ehlers Architects 
v. Carbon County, 805 P.2d 789 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991). 
—Damage to insured vehicle. 
Insurer was improperly granted summary 
judgment in suit for damage to insured's vehi-
cle where fact question existed whether vehicle 
was stolen car when wrecked or buyer on con-
ditional sales contract had taken possession of 
vehicle repossessed by finance company. Dia-
mond T. Utah, Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 21 
Utah 2d 124, 441 P.2d 705 (1968). 
—Dispersal of interest 
Summary judgment was improperly granted 
in dispute over dispersal of savings account in-
terest where settlement agreement made no 
mention of the interest while affidavit of plain-
tiff's attorney claimed that the interest was in-
cluded as part of the settlement agreement. L 
& A Drywall, Inc. v. Whitmore Constr. Co., 608 
P.2d 626 (Utah 1980). 
—Findings by court 
While findings of fact are unnecessary to 
support granting of summary judgment, the 
grant of summary judgment is precluded 
where trial judge saw fit to make and enter 
findings and conclusions, the content of which 
evidence material issues of fact. Mountain 
States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Atkin, Wright & 
Miles, 681 P.2d 1258 (Utah 1984). 
—Foreclosure of trust deeds. 
In action by vendors of real estate to fore-
close two trust deeds executed by purchasers, 
summary judgment was improper where affi-
davit in support of motion for summary judg-
ment and supporting documents showed un-
supported conclusions and unresolved issues of 
fact, even though vendors did not present affi-
davits in opposition to motion for summary 
judgment. Frisbee v. K & K Constr. Co., 676 
P.2d 387 (Utah 1984). 
—Fraud or duress. 
Where plaintiff alleged that he was forced to 
settle an insurance claim on a business-inter-
ruption policy for a reduced amount by claim 
adjuster's representation that an amount due 
the plaintiff on a fire insurance policy could 
not be paid until plaintiff agreed to the lower 
payment on the business-interruption policy, 
trial court was not justified in concluding at a 
pretrial hearing that, as a matter of law, there 
was no fraud or duress alleged, and so was not 
justified in granting summary judgment for 
the insurer. Reliable Furn. Co. v. Fidelity & 
Guar. Ins. Underwriters, 16 Utah 2d 211, 398 
P.2d 685 (1965). 
—Guardianship. 
A summary judgment dismissing an action 
to collect a promissory note because of the in-
competency of the maker was improper where 
evidence that guardian had been appointed for 
defendant under the Uniform Veterans' Guard-
ianship Act raised substantial fact issue. Home 
Town Fin. Corp. v. Frank, 13 Utah 2d 26, 368 
P.2d 72 (1962). 
—Mortgage note. 
Summary judgment was not proper where 
answer to complaint on note, although admit-
ting execution of note, further alleged that 
plaintiff was without authority to sign mort-
gage and that the matter was being litigated in 
another action between plaintiff and defen-
dant. Freed Fin. Co. v. Stoker Motor Co., 537 
P.2d 1039 (Utah 1975). 
—Negligence. 
In action to recover for injuries suffered 
when struck by rocks from dynamite blast ex-
ploded by neighboring farmers in constructing 
irrigation ditch, issues of assumption of risk 
and contributory negligence should have been 
submitted to jury where plaintiff helped in ac-
tivities of blasting to same extent and re-
treated same distance defendants did in their 
trucks but failed to dismount from his horse; 
summary judgment for defendants was va-
cated. Robison v. Robison, 16 Utah 2d 2, 394 
P.2d 876 (1964). 
Ordinarily the question of negligence and 
contributory negligence may not be settled on 
a motion for summary judgment. Preston v. 
Lamb, 20 Utah 2d 260, 436 P.2d 1021 (1968). 
Whether defendant's nominal charge for am-
bulance service constituted gratuitous accom-
modation or a payment removing passenger 
from guest status was fact question precluding 
summary judgment in action for alleged negli-
gent transportation to hospital. Willden v. 
Kennecott Copper Corp., 25 Utah 2d 96, 476 
P.2d 687 (1970). 
Naked assertions of negligence, unsupported 
by any facts, fall far short of raising a material 
issue of fact on the issue of negligence. Massey 
v. Utah Power & Light, 609 P.2d 937 (Utah 
1980). 
Summary judgment should be granted with 
great caution in negligence cases. Williams v. 
Melby, 699 P.2d 723 (Utah 1985). 
While courts should be extremely cautious in 
granting summary judgment for defendant on 
the basis that plaintiff has failed to secure ex-
pert testimony to support a medical negligence 
action, summary judgment may be allowed 
where the record indicates that plaintiff has 
had every opportunity to establish his case and 
has failed to demonstrate that he could show 
negligent acts or omissions on the part of de-
fendant by expert medical testimony and the 
issue is clearly one which cannot be deter-
mined by laymen alone. Robinson v. Inter-
mountain Health Care, Inc., 740 P.2d 262 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
Summary judgment, granted on the ground 
that plaintiff failed to file the notice required 
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in a medical malpractice action within the 
statutory limitation period, was reversed 
where the facts were unclear and did not give 
rise to the conclusion that, as a matter of law, 
plaintiff should have known of her legal inju-
ries at the time she suffered them. Brower v. 
Brown, 744 P.2d 1337 (Utah 1987). 
Trial court properly granted summary judg-
ment against a customer who sued a 
storeowner for injuries sustained in a "slip and 
fall" accident just inside the store entrance, be-
cause the customer failed to raise any material 
issues of fact beyond a bare contention that the 
storeowner was somehow negligent. Dybowski 
v. Ernest W. Hahn, Inc., 775 P.2d 445 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989). 
A trial court may not grant summary judg-
ment and thereby deny the plaintiff a trial on a 
negligence issue, including resolving the appli-
cable standard of care, unless it correctly con-
cludes that the jury could not reasonably find 
the defendant's conduct to be negligent. 
Wycalis v. Guardian Title, 780 P.2d 821 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989), cert, denied, 789 P.2d 33 (Utah 
1990). 
—Nonspecific denial of requests for admis-
sion. 
Defendant's nonspecific denials to requests 
for admission contrary to Rule 36(a) did not 
entitle plaintiff to a summary judgment. Pace 
v. Pace, 559 P.2d 964 (Utah 1977). 
—Note. 
Trial judge's action in granting plaintiffs' 
motion for summary judgment on a note, while 
reserving for trial defendants' affirmative de-
fense of lack of consideration for the same in-
strument, was inappropriate where it was not 
clear how plaintiffs could be entitled to judg-
ment on the note as a matter of law if factual 
issues sufficient to warrant trial existed as to 
whether there was consideration. Agathan-
gelides v. Shaw, 740 P.2d 259 (Utah 1987). 
—Recovery for goods and services. 
In action to recover for goods and services 
provided on an open account to a partnership, 
the record revealed disputed issues of material 
fact regarding treatment of the owner of one of 
the partners. Amjacs Interwest, Inc. v. Design 
Assocs., 635 P.2d 53 (Utah 1981). 
—Stock ownership. 
Summary judgment was not proper where 
conflicting affidavits, although not raising is-
sue of ownership of stock shares, did raise issue 
as to whether subsequent purchaser for value 
and without notice was a bona fide purchaser. 
Strand v. Prince-Covey & Co., 534 P.2d 892 
(Utah 1975). 
—Wrongful possession. 
Summary judgment was improperly granted 
for transport company in action against defen-
dant for wrongful possession of a trailer, where 
complaint alleged value of use and possession 
of $10 per day but defendant denied this and 
asserted a much lower value and also re-
quested a setoff for storage and care against 
any charge for possession. Western Pac. 
Transp. Co. v. Beehive State Agric. Coop 597 
P.2d 854 (Utah 1979) 
Summary judgment proper. 
It must appear to a certainty that the plain-
tiff would not be entitled to relief under any 
state of facts which could be proved in support 
of its claim before a judgment on the pleading 
may be granted. Securities Credit Corp. v. 
Willey, 1 Utah 2d 254, 265 P.2d 422 (1953). 
A summary judgment is proper only if the 
pleadings, depositions, affidavits and admis-
sions show that there is no genuine issue of 
material fact and that the moving party is en-
titled to a judgment as a matter of law. In re 
Williams' Estates, 10 Utah 2d 83, 348 P.2d 683 
(1960); Ruffinengo v. Miller, 579 P.2d 342 
(Utah 1978); Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 
434 (Utah 1982); Snyder v. Merkley, 693 P.2d 
64 (Utah 1984); Geneva Pipe Co. v. S & H Ins. 
Co., 714 P.2d 648 (Utah 1986); Billings ex rel. 
Billings v. Union Bankers Ins Co., 819 P 2d 
803 (Utah 1991). 
Even though the facts developed under a dis-
covery process were not consistent with the al-
legations in a counterclaim, such facts did not 
impel a finding that there was a fact issue to be 
presented to an arbiter. Continental Bank & 
Trust Co. v. Cunningham, 10 Utah 2d 329, 353 
P.2d 168 (1960). 
This rule permits an excursion beyond the 
pleading and if the facts discovered irrefutably 
disprove facts pleaded, summary judgment is 
appropriate on motion therefor. Continental 
Bank & Trust Co. v. Cunningham, 10 Utah 2d 
329, 353 P.2d 168 (1960); Aird Ins. Agency v. 
Zions First Natl Bank, 612 P.2d 341 (Utah 
1980); Gadd v. Olson.,, 685 P.2d 1041 (Utah 
1984). 
A summary judgment must be supported by 
evidence, admission and inferences which, 
when viewed in the light most favorable to the 
loser, show that "there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law"; such 
showing must preclude all reasonable possibil-
ity that the loser could, if given a trial, produce 
evidence which would reasonably sustain a 
judgment in his favor. Bullock v. Desert Dodge 
Truck Ctr., Inc., 11 Utah 2d 1, 354 P.2d 559 
(1960). 
A summary judgment is appropriate only 
where the favored party makes a showing 
which precludes, as a matter of law, the award-
ing of any relief to the losing party. Tanner v. 
Utah Poultry & Farmers Coop., 11 Utah 2d 
353, 359 P.2d 18 (1961). 
To sustain a summary judgment, the plead-
ings, evidence, admissions and inferences 
therefrom, viewed most favorably to the losing 
party, must show that there is no genuine is-
sue of material fact, and that the winning 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law. Such showing must preclude, as a matter 
of law, all reasonable possibility that the losing 
party could win if given a trial. Frederick May 
& Co. v. Dunn, 13 Utah 2d 40, 368 P.2d 266 
(1962); Judkins v. Toone, 27 Utah 2d 17, 492 
P.2d 980 (1972). 
Only where it clearly appears that the party 
against whom the judgment would be granted 
cannot possibly establish a right to recover 
should summary judgment be granted, and any 
doubts should be resolved in favor of such 
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party when summary judgment against him is 
being considered. Reliable Furn. Co. v. Fidelity 
& Guar. Ins. Underwriters, 16 Utah 2d 211, 
398 P2d 685 (1965). 
A summary judgment can be granted only 
when it is shown that there is no genuine issue 
as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law 
under those facts. Singleton v. Alexander, 19 
Utah 2d 292, 431 P.2d 126 (1967); Sandberg v. 
Klein, 576 P.2d 1291 (Utah 1978). 
Summary judgment should be granted only 
when it clearly appears that there are no is-
sues of material fact in dispute, which if re-
solved in favor of the adverse party would enti-
tle him to prevail. University Club v. Invesco 
Holding Corp., 29 Utah 2d 1, 504 P.2d 29 
(1972). 
A summary judgment motion should be 
granted only when all the facts entitling the 
moving party to a judgment are clearly estab-
lished or admitted. Sorenson v. Beers, 585 P.2d 
458 (Utah 1978). 
A summary judgment is appropriate only 
where the favored party makes a showing 
which precludes, as a matter of law, the award-
ing of any relief to the losing party. FMA Ac-
ceptance Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 594 P.2d 
1332 (Utah 1979). 
A summary judgment must be supported by 
evidence, admissions and inferences which, 
when viewed in the light most favorable to the 
losing side, establishes that there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and the moving 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law. Bihlmaier v. Carson, 603 P.2d 790 (Utah 
1979). 
The grant of a motion for summary judgment 
(or the affirmance thereof on appeal) is appro-
priate only where there exists no genuine is-
sues of fact relevant to the disposition of the 
claim underlying the motion. L & A Drywall, 
Inc. v. Whitmore Constr. Co., 608 P.2d 626 
(Utah 1980). 
Where pleadings, answers to interrogatories 
and depositions disclosed undisputed facts 
which permitted resolution of controversy as a 
matter of law, it was appropriate to enter sum-
mary judgment. Aird Ins. Agency v. Zions First 
Nat'l Bank, 612 P.2d 341 (Utah 1980). 
Even if there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact, a summary judgment is proper 
only if the pleadings and other documents dem-
onstrate that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as matter of law. Lockhart Co. v. An-
derson, 646 P.2d 678 (Utah 1982). 
Summary judgment should be granted only 
when it clearly appears that there is no reason-
able probability that the party moved against 
could prevail. Snyder v. Merkley, 693 P.2d 64 
i Utah 1984). 
Summary judgment should be granted only 
when it is clear from the undisputed facts that 
the opposing party cannot prevail. Conder v. 
A.L. Williams & Assocs., 739 P.2d 634 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1987); Bray Lines v. Utah Carriers, 
Inc., 739 P.2d 1115 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
When the moving party has presented evi-
dence sufficient to support a judgment in its 
favor, and the opposing party fails to submit 
contrary evidence, a trial court is justified in 
concluding that no genuine issue of fact is 
present or would be at trial. Arnica Mut. Ins. 
Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989). 
—Contract action. 
Summary judgment was properly awarded 
car dealer suing bank for portion of reserve 
account being held by bank to secure condi-
tional sales contract sold to bank since acts and 
statements of dealer did not in fact terminate 
contract and consequently there was no genu-
ine issue of fact requiring trial. Spencer Auto 
Sales, Inc. v. First Sec. Bank, 20 Utah 2d 145, 
434 P.2d 455 (1967). 
—Contract terms. 
Only when contract terms are complete, 
clear, and unambiguous can they be inter-
preted by the judge on a motion for summary 
judgment. If the evidence as to the terms of an 
agreement is in conflict, the intent of the par-
ties as to the terms of the agreement is to be 
determined by the jury. Colonial Leasing Co. v. 
Larsen Bros. Constr. Co., 731 P.2d 483 (Utah 
1986). 
—Deceit 
Where defendants in an action in deceit 
based upon misrepresentation produced evi-
dence that pierced the allegations of the com-
plaint and the plaintiff did not controvert, ex-
plain or destroy that evidence by counteraffi-
davit or otherwise, the court would be justified 
in concluding that no genuine issue of fact was 
present and that summary judgment should be 
rendered for the moving party. Dupler v. 
Yates, 10 Utah 2d 251, 351 P.2d 624 (1960). 
—Jurisdiction. 
Bare contention that Arizona court did not 
have jurisdiction, unsupported by any specifi-
cation of facts in support thereof, raised no 
question of fact so that entry of summary judg-
ment according full faith and credit to the Ari-
zona judgment was not error. Transamerica Ti-
tle Ins. Co. v. United Resources, Inc., 24 Utah 
2d 346, 471 P.2d 165 (1970). 
—Negligence. 
Summary judgment for defendant was 
proper where pleadings and depositions 
showed no negligence or omission of duty of 
reasonable care. Long v. Smith Food King 
Store, 531 P.2d 360 (Utah 1973). 
Issues of negligence ordinarily present ques-
tions of fact to be resolved by the fact-finder 
and it is only when the facts are undisputed 
and where but one reasonable conclusion can 
be drawn therefrom that such issues become 
questions of law appropriate for summary 
judgment. FMA Acceptance Co. v. Leatherby 
Ins. Co., 594 P.2d 1332 (Utah 1979). 
Although summary judgment may on occa-
sion be appropriate in negligence cases, it is 
appropriate only in the most clear-cut case. 
Ingram v. Salt Lake City, 733 P.2d 126 (Utah 
1987). 
—Res ipsa loquitur. 
Summary judgment was properly awarded 
defendant in an action where the plaintiff, a 
powder man, was injured when a cap and stick 
of dynamite of defendant's manufacture ex-
ploded as he placed them in a drilled hole, and 
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there was no evidence as to how or why they 
exploded, none as to when or how either of 
them were manufactured, and none as to how 
or by whom they had been handled or treated 
prior to their use, except as plaintiff himself 
handled them. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur 
was not applicable under the circumstances re-
cited. To apply it would be to impose absolute 
liability and insurability upon manufacturers 
of explosives and perhaps most any other com-
modity and would extend the fact or fiction of 
control necessary to invoke the doctrine to an 
unreasonable, impractical and unrealistic de-
gree. Matievitch v. Hercules Powder Co., 3 
Utah 2d 283, 282 P.2d 1044 (1955). 
Time for motion. 
Defendant violated this rule by moving for 
summary judgment only when the case was 
called for trial. Hein's Turkey Hatcheries Inc. 
v. Nephi Processing Plant, Inc., 24 Utah 2d 
271, 470 P.2d 257 (1970). 
Written statement of grounds. 
Because a summary judgment motion can be 
denied for at least two reasons, either because 
judgment is not merited or because factual is-
sues preclude a grant of summary judgment, a 
trial court decision denying summary judg-
ment should be expressed in a brief, written 
statement, identifying the grounds for denying 
summary judgment. Estate Landscape & Snow 
Removal Specialists, Inc. v. Mountain States 
Tel. & Tel. Co., 793 P.2d 415 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990). 
Inasmuch as summary judgment is only ap-
propriate when there is no genuine issue of 
material fact, and the moving party is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law, the inclusion of 
the requirement in Rule 52(a) that the court 
shall issue a statement of the ground for its 
decision cannot bear upon the undisputed fac-
tual basis for the decision. Hence, it can only 
bear upon alternative theories of law that may 
apply to the facts. Neerings v. Utah State Bar, 
817 P.2d 320 (Utah 1991). 
An important reason for inclusion of the re-
quirement that the trial court state the ground 
for its decision in summary judgment cases is 
administrative in nature: to provide a ready 
basis for review on appeal. However, also from 
the administrative point of view, failure to 
state the grounds for its decision would not 
constitute reversible error. Rather, in an ap-
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as affected by presentation of counterclaim, 8 
A.L.R.3d 1361. 
Reviewability of order denying motion for 
summary judgment, 15 A.L.R.3d 899. 
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as affected by opponent's motion for summary 
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rected verdict, 36 A.L.R.3d 1113. 
Dead man's statute, use of evidence exclud-
able under, to defeat or support summary judg-
ment, 67 A.L.R.3d 970. 
Liability in tort for interference with physi-
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A.L.R.4th 572. 
Admissibility of oral testimony at state sum-
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proceedings, 53 A.L.R.4th 561. 
Necessity of oral argument on motion for 
summary judgment or judgment on pleadings 
in federal court, 105 A.L.R. Fed 755. 
Key Numbers. — Judgment •=» 178 to 190. 
Rule 57. Declaratory judgments. 
The procedure for obtaining a declaratory judgment pursuant to Chapter 33 
of Title 78, U.C.A. 1953, shall be in accordance with these rules, and the right 
to trial by jury may be demanded under the circumstances and in the manner 
provided in Rules 38 and 39. The existence of another adequate remedy does 
not preclude a judgment for declaratory relief in cases where it is appropriate. 
The court may order a speedy hearing of an action for a declaratory judgment 
and may advance it on the calendar. 
Compiler's Notes. 
Rule 57, F.R.C.P. 
- This rule is similar to 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in Oil Shale Corp. v. Larson, 20 Utah 
2d 369, 438 P.2d 540 (1968). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
declaratory relief in state court, 33 A.L.R.4th 
146. 
Key Numbers. — Declaratory Judgment •» 
41, 42, 251, 367. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 22A Am. Jur. 2d Declara-
tory Judgments §§ 183, 186, 203 et seq. 
C.J.S. — 26 C J.S. Declaratory Judgments 
§§ 17, 18, 104, 155. 
A.L.R. — Right to jury trial in action for 
Rule 58A. Entry. 
(a) Judgment upon the verdict of a jury. Unless the court otherwise 
directs and subject to the provisions of Rule 54(b), judgment upon the verdict 
of a jury shall be forthwith signed by the clerk and filed. If there is a special 
verdict or a general verdict accompanied by answers to interrogatories re-
turned by a jury pursuant to Rule 49, the court shall direct the appropriate 
judgment which shall be forthwith signed by the clerk and filed. 
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388 P.2d 798 (1964); Hanson v. General Bldrs. 
Supply Co., 15 Utah 2d 143, 389 P.2d 61 
(1964); James Mfg. Co. v. Wilson, 15 Utah 2d 
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statute or rules of court, 3 A.L.R.3d 1191. 
Propriety and prejudicial effect of suggestion 
or comments by judge as to compromise or set-
tlement of civil case, 6 A.L.R.3d 1457. 
Necessity and propriety of counter-affidavits 
in opposition to motion for new trial in civil 
case, 7 A.L.R.3d 1000. 
Quotient verdicts, 8 A.L.R.3d 335. 
Propriety and prejudicial effect of instruc-
tions in civil case as affected by the manner in 
which they are written, 10 A.L.R.3d 501. 
Prejudicial effect of unauthorized view by 
jury in civil case of scene of accident or prem-
ises in question, 11 A.L.R.3d 918. 
Propriety and prejudicial effect of reference 
by counsel in civil case to result of former trial 
of same case, or amount of verdict therein, 15 
A.L.R.3d 1101. 
Absence of judge from courtroom during trial 
of civil case, 25 A.L.R.3d 637. 
Juror's voir dire denial or nondisclosure of 
acquaintance or relationship with attorney in 
case, or with partner or associate of such attor-
ney, as ground for new trial or mistrial, 64 
A.L.R.3d 126. 
Amendment, after expiration of time for fil-
ing motion for new trial, in civil case, of motion 
made in due time, 69 A.L.R.3d 845. 
Authority of state court to order jury trial in 
civil case where jury has been waived or not 
demanded by parties, 9 A.L.R.4th 1041. 
Deafness of juror as ground for impeaching 
verdict, or securing new trial or reversal on 
appeal, 38 A.L.R.4th 1170. 
Jury trial waiver as binding on later state 
civil trial, 48 A.L.R.4th 747. 
Court reporter's death or disability prior to 
transcribing notes as grounds for reversal or 
new trial, 57 A.L.R.4th 1049. 
Excessiveness or adequacy of compensatory 
damages for personal injury to or death of sea-
man in actions under Jones Act (46 USCS 
Appx. § 688) or doctrine of unseaworthiness — 
modern cases, 96 A.L.R. Fed. 541. 
Excessiveness or adequacy of awards of dam-
ages for personal injury or death in actions un-
der Federal Employers' Liability Act (45 USCS 
§§ 51 et seq.) — modern cases, 97 A.L.R. Fed. 
189. 
Key Numbers. — New Trial «=» 13 et seq., 
110, 116. 
Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order. 
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other 
parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may 
be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of 
any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pen-
dency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is 
docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending 
may be so corrected with leave of the appellate court. 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evi-
dence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may 
in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a 
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence 
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a 
new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrin-
sic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; 
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(4) when, for any cause, the summons in an action has not been personally 
served upon the defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has 
tailed to appear in said action; (5) the judgment is void; (6) the judgment has 
been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is 
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that 
the judgment should have prospective application; or (7) any other reason 
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made 
within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not more than 3 
jionths after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A 
motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or 
suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to enter-
tain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or pro-
ceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for 
obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these 
rules or by an independent action. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
Rule 60, F.R.C.P. 
Cross-References. — Fee for filing motion 
to set aside judgment, § 21-1-5. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
"Any other reason justifying relief." 
—Default judgment. 
—Impossibility of compliance with order. 
—Incompetent counsel. 
—Lack of due process. 
—Merits of case. 
—Mistake or inadvertence. 
—Real party in interest. 
Appeals. 
Clerical mistakes. 
—Computation of damages. 
—Correction after appeal. 
—Date of judgment. 
Void judgment. 
—Estate record. 
—Inherent power of courts. 
—Intent of court and parties. 
—Judicial error distinguished. 
—Order prepared by counsel. 
—Predating of new trial motion. 
Court's discretion. 
Default judgment. 




Form of motion. 
Independent action. 
—Constitutionality of taxes. 
—Divorce decree. 
—Fraud or duress. 
—Motion distinguished. 
Invalid summons. 
—Amendment without notice. 
Inequity of prospective application. 
Jurisdiction. 





Merits of claim. 
Negligence of attorney. 
No claim for relief. 
—Delayed motion for new trial. 
—Failure to file cost bill. 
—Failure to file notice of appeal. 
—Nonreceipt of notice and findings. 
—Trial court's discretion. 
—Unemployment compensation appeal. 
—Workmen's compensation appeal. 
Newly discovered evidence. 
—Burden of proof. 
—Discretion not abused. 
Procedure. 
—Notice to parties. 
Res judicata. 
Reversal of judgment. 
—Invalidation of sale. 
Satisfaction, release or discharge. 
—Accord and satisfaction. 
—Discharging representative of estate from 
further demand. 
—Erroneously included damages. 
—Prospective application of judgment. 
Timeliness of motion. 
—Confused mental condition of party. 





—Mistake, inadvertence and neglect. 
—Newly discovered evidence. 
—Order entered upon erroneous assumption. 
—"Reasonable time." 





—Lack of jurisdiction. 
Cited. 
"Any other reason justifying relief." 
Subdivision (7) embodies three require-
ments: First, that the reason be one other than 
those listed in Subdivisions (1) through (6); sec-
ond, that the reason justify relief; and third, 
that the motion be made within a reasonable 
time. Laub v. South Cent. Utah Tel. Ass'n, 657 
P.2d 1304 (Utah 1982); Richins v. Delbert 
Chipman & Sons, 817 P.2d 382 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991). 
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18 DAVID S. YOUNG, JUDGE IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
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 — 
000871 
A P P E A R A N C E S 
FOR THE PLAINTIFF 
FOR THE DEFENDANT: 
MR. FERRICKS' ARGUMENT 
MR. HIMONAS' ARGUMENT 
JUDGE'S RULING 
RUSSELL C. FERRICKS 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
50 SOUTH MAIN STREET 
KEY BANK TOWER, SUITE 700 
P.O. BOX 2465 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84110-2465 
RANDALL N. SKANCHY 
DINO G. HIMONAS 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & MC DONOljGH 
1500 FIRST INTERSTATE PLAZA 
170 SOUTH MAIN STREET 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101 







JUDGE YOUNG: GOOD MORNING. THIS IS THE TIME 
SET FOR ARGUMENT IN THE MATTER OF JOE TREMBLY VERSUS MRS. 
FIELDS COOKIES. THE CASE NUMBER IS 10756. 
COUNSEL, WOULD YOU STATE YOUR APPEARANCES, PLEASE?| 
MR. FERRICKS: RUSSELL FERRICKS ON BEHALF OF 
THE PLAINTIFF, JOE TREMBLY. 
JUDGE YOUNG: THANK YOU. 
MR. HIMONAS: RANDY SKANCHY AND DENO HIMONAS 
ON BEHALF OF THE DEFENDANT, YOUR HONOR, MRS. FIELDS COOKIES. 
JUDGE YOUNG: THANK YOU EACH. 
MR. FERRICKS, DO YOU WISH TO BE HEARD FIRST ON 
YOUR MOTION TO STRIKE? 
MR. FERRICKS: YES, YOUR HONOR. BRIEFLY, I JUST 
FILED A MOTION TO STRIKE THE MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM ORDER. 
I DID A LITTLE RESEARCH YESTERDAY AND DETERMINED THAT THIS 
WAS, IN ESSENCE, THE MOTION FROM RELIEF FROM ORDER, IS 
ESSENTIALLY A MOTION FOR THIS COURT TO RECONSIDER, WHICH 
IS IMPROPER UNDER THE STANDARDS OF PEAY V. PEAY, AND DRURY 
V. LUNCEFORD. WE ALSO THINK THAT THIS MOTION VIOLATES THE 
RULE OF THE--OR THE LAW OF THE CASE RULE AND BECAUSE NO 
NEW FACTS HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED AND SUPPORTED, THE MOTION 
FOR RELIEF, AND BECAUSE NO NEW LEGAL STANDARDS HAVE BEEN 
OFFERED IN SUPPORT OF THE MOTION FOR RELIEF, IT IS 
ESSENTIALLY JUST A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WHICH IS 
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NOT PERMITTED BY THE SUPREME COURT RULES. 
JUDGE YOUNG: ALL RIGHT. I UNDERSTAND YOUR 





YOU WOULD UNDERSTAND THAT MY VIEW OF THAT WOULD BE 
IT WOULD BE PRESERVED AS AN ISSUE FOR APPEAL. 
MR. FERRICKS: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 
JUDGE YOUNG: BECAUSE THE COURT HAS THE VIEW 
WERE I THE JUDGE HANDLING THIS CASE--AS YOU KNOW, WE 
, EFFECTIVELY, A MODIFIED INDIVIDUAL CALENDAR BUT PRINCI-
PALLY A MASTER CALENDAR IN THE SUMMIT AND TOOELE PORTIONS 
OF OUR DISTRICT, AND SO I HAVE COME ON TO THIS CASE AFTER 
SOME 
THE 
DECISIONS HAVE BEEN MADE, AND NORMALLY I WOULD FOLLOW 
LAW OF THE CASE AS DEVELOPED BY ANOTHER JUDGE. IT'S 





OF EMPLOYMENT, WAS INITIALLY AT-WILL--IT'S MY VIEW 
IN THIS, AND THE ACCOMPANYING POWER CASE, WAS THAT 
MR. FERRICKS: MARIAMERCEDES POWER. 
JUDGE YOUNG: MARIAMERCEDES POWER. IN THAT CASE 
COURT WAS OF THE VIEW THAT IT WAS A QUESTION OF LAW 
TO DETERMINE WHETHER AN AT-WILL CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIP 
HAD BEEN MODIFIED IN SOME WAY TO CREATE AN IMPLIED-IN-FACT 
AGREEMENT THAT WAS DIFFERENT FROM THE AT-WILL AGREEMENT. 
AND AFTER READING THE TWO CASES THAT HAD BEEN DECIDED SINCE 
JUDGE WILKINSON HAD MADE HIS RULING IN THE MARIAMERCEDES 
4 
000874 
POWER CASE THE COURT DETERMINED THAT HAD HE HAD THOSE CASES 
AVAILABLE TO HIM HE WOULD HAVE HAD TO HAVE BELIEVED THAT 
THERE WAS ESTABLISHED IN THE PLEADINGS, OR IN THE EVIDENCE 
THAT HAS BEEN PRESENTED, A SUFFICIENT FACTUAL BASIS TO 
DETERMINE THAT THE AT-WILL AGREEMENT HAD BEEN CHANGED TO 
AN IMPLIED-IN-FACT CONTRACT, SUCH AS WAS THE CASE IN ONE 
OF THOSE WHERE THE INDIVIDUAL WHO WORKED FOR FIRST SECURITY 
BANK WAS TOLD THAT WHILE HE WAS HAVING EMOTIONAL AND OTHER 
DIFFICULTIES HE SHOULD TAKE WHATEVER TIME WOULD BE NECESSARY 
TO RECOVER AND THAT HE WOULD NOT BE FIRED FOR THE TIME OFF 
FOR THIS MEDICAL MALADY. THAT GAVE HIM THE--THAT MEANT 
THEN THAT THERE WAS A LEGITIMATE QUESTION OF FACT FOR FIRST 
SECURITY AND FOR THE PLAINTIFF TO DETERMINE WHETHER HE WAS 
FIRED FOR THAT REASON OR FOR OTHER REASONS. NOW THAT, I 
BELIEVE, IS THE LAW THAT MUST BE ESTABLISHED HERE. 
WOULD IT BE A QUESTION OF LAW FOR THE COURT TO 
DECIDE WHETHER THE PARTY HAD PLED OR ESTABLISHED A SUFFICIENT) 
FACTUAL BASIS FOR THE COURT TO DETERMINE THAT THERE COULD 
BE A LEGITIMATE CONCLUSION THAT THERE WAS AN IMPLIED-IN-
FACT CONTRACT CREATED DIFFERENT— 
NOW, EXCUSE ME FOR A MOMENT. THE CLERK HAS 
ADVISED ME THAT I HAVE HAD SET A CONFERENCE CALL THAT WAS 
TO COME IN. IF YOU WILL JUST REMAIN HERE AND EXCUSE ME 
FOR A MOMENT I'D LIKE TO TAKE THAT AND GET THAT MATTER 
BRIEFLY RESOLVED. 
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MR. FERRICKS: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 
(RECESS). 
JUDGE YOUNG: THANK YOU. ANYWAY 
WITHOUT REPEATING, I HAVE THE VIEW THAT IF 
', MR. FERRICKS, 
THIS WERE MY 
CASE AND I HAD HANDLED IT THROUGHOUT, I WOULD HAVE CALLED 
IT BACK WITH THE ADDITIONAL CASES AND WOULD 
CONSISTENT WITH WHAT I HAVE NOW DONE. SO I 
PROBLEM WITH THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE THAT MOTION MUST 
IS DENIED. 
MR. FERRICKS: I APPRECIATE THE 
) HAVE RULED 
UNDERSTAND THE 
1 BUT UNDER THE 
BE AND THE SAME 
CLARIFICATION. 
JUDGE YOUNG: EXCUSE ME, THE MOTION TO STRIKE 
IS DENIED. 
MR. FERRICKS: I APPRECIATE THE 
OF THAT. 
CLARIFICATION 
JUDGE YOUNG: ALL RIGHT. I THINK CONSISTENT, 
WITH THAT IN MIND, I SHOULD ASK YOU IN RELATION TO THE 
CURRENT MOTION TO BE CONSIDERED FOR RELIEF 
THAT HAS BEEN FILED BY MR. SKANCHY AND MR. 
THAT MOTION--WE ALL KNOW WHAT MY VIEW IS IN 
FROM THE ORDER 
HIMONAS AS TO 
1 RELATION TO 
THE MARIAMERCEDES POWER CASE, SO WHAT I WOULD LIKE TO ASK 
YOU, MR. FERRICKS, IS IF YOU COULD GIVE ME WHAT YOU BELIEVE 
WOULD BE THE FACTUAL BASIS TO CHANGE THIS AGREEMENT FROM 
AN AT-WILL AGREEMENT TO AN IMPLIED-IN-FACT AGREEMENT. WHAT 
6 
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1 CONDUCT OCCURRED BY THE DEFENDANT OR IN RELATION TO THE 
2 PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT THAT WOULD SEPARATE MR. TREMBLY 
3 FROM AN AT-WILL CONTRACT? 
4
 MR. FERRICKS: LET ME SEE IF I CAN DO THAT 
5 PROMPTLY, YOUR HONOR. THE REPRESENTATION AT PAGES 2 THROUGH 
* 9 OF THE MEMORANDUM OPPOSING SUMMARY JUDGMENT--
7
 JUDGE YOUNG: OKAY. 
8 MR. FERRICKS: THE ENTIRE MEMORANDUM HAS BEEN 
9 ATTACHED TO MY OBJECTION TO THE PRESENT MOTION FOR RELIEF, 
10 LAYS OUT SPECIFIC INSTANCES THAT MR. TREMBLY WAS HIRED IN 
11 1986 BY MRS. FIELDS, BY THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, MITCHELL 
12 DORIN. MITCHELL DORIN SAID AT THE TIME THAT HE WAS HIRED 
13 THAT THE COMPANY FOLLOWED CERTAIN PROCEDURES AND THAT YOU 
14 HAVE "X" AMOUNT OF MISTAKES BEFORE YOU'RE TERMINATED, YOU 
15 KNOW, WE HAVE TO FOLLOW THIS PROCESS OF STAGES 1, 2, 3 AND 
16 4 BEFORE WE CAN DISCIPLINE YOU. THAT UNDERSTANDING, THAT 
17 BEGAN AT THE VERY INCEPTION OF HIS EMPLOYMENT WITH MRS. 
18 FIELDS, WAS CONTINUED THROUGHOUT HIS EMPLOYMENT, IN HIS 
19 TRAINING ON HOW HE, HIMSELF, WAS TO MANAGE EMPLOYEES, IT 
20 WAS CONTINUED THROUGHOUT BY HIS PRIMARY SUPERVISOR WHO IS 
21 MR. CRAIG ATNIP, BY THE PERSON WHO EVENTUALLY TERMINATED 
2 2
 HIM, KERRI KELLER. 
23 I THINK IT WOULD BE HELPFUL FOR THE COURT TO 
2 4
 UNDERSTAND A LITTLE BIT OF A SETTING OF HOW MR. TREMBLY 
2 5
 WAS TERMINATED. MR. TREMBLY HAD WORKED FOR THE COMPANY 
nriAQ**? •; 
FOR SEVERAL YEARS AND WORKED IN THE FLORIDA AREA. HE HAD 
BEEN OFF FOR A PERIOD OF TIME BECAUSE OF AN ILLNESS AND 
WHEN HE CAME BACK TO HIS DISTRICT IN FLORIDA HE WAS MOVED 
BY KERRI KELLER TO AN ADJACENT DISTRICT FOR A TEMPORARY 
PERIOD OF TIME WHILE HE WAS WAITING TO TAKE OVER TRAINING 
AND SUPERVISION OF THE MARRIOTT STORES. THEY CALLED THEM 
THE TURNPIKE STORES. MARRIOTT HAD A CONCESSION TO RUN 
CERTAIN OUTLETS ON THE FLORIDA TURNPIKE AND OTHER AREAS 
OF THE EAST COAST. AND JOE'S JOB WAS GOING TO BE TO TRAIN 
AND WRITE PROCEDURES FOR THE MARRIOTT TURNPIKE STORES. 
BUT WHILE HE WAS WAITING TO ENGAGE IN THAT ACTIVITY HE WAS 
ASKED TO MOVE TO AN ADJACENT DISTRICT AND TO ESSENTIALLY 
CLEAN IT UP. AND KERRI KELLER SENT HIM DOWN THERE WITH 
SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS ABOUT YOU SHOULD FOLLOW THESE DISCI-
PLINARY PROCEDURES, WE NEED TO CLEAN OUT SOME OF THIS DEAD-
WOOD, MAKE SURE YOU PUT PEOPLE ON NOTICE ABOUT WHAT'S 
EXPECTED OF THEM, MAKE SURE THEY'VE HAD THE OPPORTUNITY 
TO PERFORM AND IF THEY HAVEN'T PERFORMED LET'S ELIMINATE 
THEM FROM THE COMPANY. 
VERY SHORTLY AFTER HE TOOK OVER THIS DISTRICT 
AN INSPECTION WAS MADE OF THE DISTRICT BY MR. PAUL BAIRD, 
WHO WAS THE DIRECTOR OF THE ENTIRE OPERATIONS OF MRS. FIELDS 
COOKIES. MR. BAIRD, BEING KERRI KELLER'S BOSS, TOURED THE 
FLORIDA AREA WITH KERRI KELLER. KERRI KELLER BEING A FAIRLY 
RECENT EMPLOYEE, BY THE WAY, OF MRS. FIELDS. 
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DURING THAT INSPECTION THERE WERE CERTAIN 
DEFICIENCIES, APPARENTLY, IN MR. TREMBLY'S AREA. MR. TREMBL1J 
HAD BEEN TOLD A NUMBER OF THINGS. FIRST OF ALL, GO IN AND 
TRAIN A SPECIFIC STORE MANAGER TO TAKE OVER A SPECIFIC STORE 
THAT REQUIRED A VERY POINTED ONE ON ONE EFFORT BY MR. 
TREMBLY. HE WAS DOING THAT. 
HE WAS GIVEN THE CONTRARY, OR CONFLICTING INSTRU-
TION TOO, AT THE SAME TIME, ELIMINATE CERTAIN STORE MANAGERS 
FROM OTHER STORES IN THAT DISTRICT. 
AND A THIRD INSTRUCTION TOO, AT THE SAME TIME, 
BRING THE ENTIRE DISTRICT UP TO STANDARD. 
SO IN A VERY SHORT FEW WEEKS HE WAS ASKED TO 
ACCOMPLISH THREE GOALS. AND WHEN MR. BAIRD CAME THROUGH 
AND WAS DISSATISFIED WITH SOME OF THE GENERAL STANDARDS 
IN THE DISTRICT THAT HE SAW, KERRI KELLER THEN WAS GIVEN 
INSTRUCTIONS BY MR. BAIRD TO GO BACK TO THAT FLORIDA DISTRIC 
AND QUOTE, "GET SOMETHING ON JOE TREMBLY," END QUOTE, AND 
ELIMINATE HIM FROM THE COMPANY, ACCORDING TO REPORTS OF 
MR. BAIRD THAT KERRI KELLER GAVE, BECAUSE JOE WAS AFTER 
KERRI'S JOB, AND ACCORDING TO KERRI KELLER'S REPORTS TO 
HER FRIEND THERESA CASURICK, OR THERESA BARR, AS SHE'S ALSO 
KNOWN, BECAUSE JOE MADE KERRI LOOK BAD DURING THE INSPECTION 
JUDGE YOUNG: LET ME JUST BE SURE THAT I--CAN 
YOU GO BACK OVER THAT SO I UNDERSTAND IT? 
YOU'RE SAYING THAT WHEN MR. BAIRD TOURED THE 
nonR7H 
FLORIDA AREA HE WAS DISSATISFIED. 
MR. FERRICKS: THAT IS CORRECT, YOUR HONOR. 
JUDGE YOUNG: AND HE WAS TOURING THAT AREA WITH 
MR. KELLER. 
MR. FERRICKS: WITH MS. KELLER, KERRI KELLER. 
JUDGE YOUNG: EXCUSE ME. WITH MS. KELLER. AND 
HE TOLD MS. KELLER AFTER HE WAS DISSATISFIED IN WHAT HE 
OBSERVED FOR MS. KELLER TO GO BACK AND GET SOMETHING ON 
MR. TREMBLY? 
MR. FERRICKS: THAT'S CORRECT. 
JUDGE YOUNG: TO FIRE HIM. 
MR. FERRICKS: THAT'S CORRECT. 
JUDGE YOUNG*. ALL RIGHT. THAT WOULD BE YOUR 
ALLEGATION AS TO WHAT HE DID. 
MR. FERRICKS: THAT'S RIGHT. NOW, IN ADDITION 
TO THAT INSTRUCTION, KERRI KELLER, FEELING RESENTMENT ABOUT 
HOW THE DISTRICT LOOKED WHEN MR. BAIRD CAME THROUGH, ALSO 
WENT BACK WITH AN EYE TO GETTING SOMETHING ON JOE TREMBLY. 
IN ESSENCE-
JUDGE YOUNG: INDEPENDENT. BOTH, WITH MR. BAIRD' S, 
BLESSING AND INDEPENDENTLY BECAUSE SHE WAS HURT BY HOW IT 
APPEARED TO HIM. 
MR. FERRICKS: THAT'S CORRECT. NOW THIS ENTIRE 
SCENARIO VIOLATES THE STANDARDS THAT HAVE BEEN REPEATED 
AD INFINITUM TO JOE TREMBLY SINCE THE INCEPTION OF HIS 
10 
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EMPLOYMENT BECAUSE MRS. FIELDS COOKIES' POLICY IS TO MAKE 
SURE THAT THE EMPLOYEE KNOWS WHAT'S EXPECTED OF HIM, GIVEN 
AN OPPORTUNITY TO PERFORM WHAT IS EXPECTED OF HIM, INCLUDING 
THE TIME SUFFICIENT TO ACCOMPLISH WHAT'S BEEN EXPECTED OF 
HIM. 
JUDGE YOUNG: SO WHAT YOU'RE REALLY SAYING THEN, 
IF I FOLLOW THIS, IS THAT THERE REALLY ISN'T A SITUATION 
WHERE ONE MAY BE FIRED AT FIRST MEETING. 
MR. FERRICKS: THERE ARE SOME INSTANCES WHERE 
THE EMPLOYEE CAN BE TERMINATED IMMEDIATELY BUT THOSE ARE 
ALL FOR POOR CONDUCT, BAD CONDUCT ACTS. THOSE ARE ACTUALLY 
LISTED IN THE POLICY AND PROCEDURES MANUAL. BUT THIS IS 
A PERFORMANCE QUESTION. AND IN A NUMBER OF INSTANCES, AND 
INCLUDING, YOUR HONOR, VERY, VERY EXPLICITLY, AND I CAN'T 
EMPHASIZE IT ENOUGH, IN THE VIDEOTAPE, "WHAT WE STAND FOR." 
I HAVE A COPY HERE OF THE EDITED PORTIONS OF THE VIDEOTAPE. 
I HAVE THE ACTUAL FULL-LENGTH VIDEO WHICH IS ABOUT AN HOUR 
AND 15 MINUTES LONG AND I HAVE A TRANSCRIPT OF THE VIDEO 
THAT HIGHLIGHTS THE EDITED PORTION. I'D BE HAPPY TO LEAVE 
ANY OF THIS WITH THE COURT FOR THE COURT'S REVIEW. 
THESE ASSURANCES BY DEBBI AND RANDY FIELDS THAT 
FAIRNESS MEANS THAT YOU'LL BE GIVEN NOTICE OF WHAT'S EXPECTED 
OF YOU, AND THE OPPORTUNITY TO ACCOMPLISH THAT, NOTIFICATION 
OF WHEN YOU'RE NOT PERFORMING UP TO THOSE EXPECTATIONS AND 
REASONABLE OPPORTUNITIES TO COMPLY WITH THESE STANDARDS. 
11 
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1 NOW THIS IS CONSISTENT THROUGHOUT. IT IS MOST EMPHATICALLY 
2 STATED IN "WHAT WE STAND FOR," WHICH IS THE VIDEOTAPE. 
3 NOW, THAT SORT OF SETS THE FACTUAL SCENARIO OF HOW MR. 
4 TREMBLY WAS TERMINATED AND THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF WHY THEY 
5 VIOLATED HIS EMPLOYMENT. I CAN HIGHLIGHT SOME MORE. 
6 JUDGE YOUNG: WHAT WAS THE--GIVEN THAT THIS IS 
7 YOUR POSITION, THEN WHAT WAS THE BASIS UPON WHICH HE WAS 
8 TOLD HE WAS TERMINATED? 
9 MR. FERRICKS: HE WAS TOLD HE WAS TERMINATED 
10 BECAUSE--LET ME SEE. I HAVE KERRI KELLER'S DEPOSITION RIGHT 
11 HERE. NOT INSURING PROPER TREATMENT OF THE STAFF IN HIS 
12 DISTRICT AND NOT COMPLETING STANDARD DSM, WHICH MEANS DIS-
13 TRICT SALES MANAGER, DUTIES, I.E., VISITING AND CALLING 
14 THE STORES ON A REGULAR BASIS, NOT PROPERLY TRAINING THE 
15 MANAGERIAL TEAM TO HANDLE NORMAL SITUATIONS ENCOUNTERED 
16 ON A DAILY BASIS. NOW THESE ARE ALL PERFORMANCE ISSUES. 
17 AND THE QUESTION IS, WAS IT FAIR, UNDER THE STANDARD OF 
18 FAIRNESS THAT RANDY FIELDS ESTABLISHED IN "WHAT WE STAND 
19 FOR," WAS IT FAIR TO TERMINATE JOE TREMBLY AFTER THROWING 
20 HIM INTO THIS MESS, ASKING HIM TO HANDLE THREE SIMULTANEOUS 
21 OBJECTIVES THAT EACH REQUIRED SOME TIME, AND THEN TO SWING 
22 THROUGH ON THE INSPECTION TOUR AND ESSENTIALLY MAKE JOE 
23 TREMBLY THE SCAPEGOAT FOR AN AREA OF THE COMPANY THAT WASN'T 
24 PERFORMING UP TO MANAGEMENT STANDARDS. 
25 JUDGE YOUNG: HOW LONG HAD MR. TREMBLY BEEN IN 
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1 THIS NEW AREA, NEW DISTRICT? 
2 MR. FERRICKS: JUST A MATTER OF A FEW WEEKS, 
3 YOUR HONOR. I THINK THAT THE TOTAL TIME SEQUENCE WAS SIX 
4 WEEKS FROM THE TIME HE TOOK THAT POSITION TO THE TIME HE 
5 WAS DISMISSED. I MAY BE OFF BY A WEEK OR TWO ON THAT. 
6 NOW I WANT TO EMPHASIZE THAT THIS FAIRNESS IS A.J-V 
7 JUST A GENERAL DISCUSSION IN MRS. FIELDS CONTEXT ABOUT WE 
8 JUST WANT TO BE NICE TO EVERYBODY. IN HIS VIDEOTAPE THAT 
9 JOE TREMBLY SAW, AND BY THE WAY, THAT JOE TREMBLY USED TO 
10 TRAIN OTHER PEOPLE--
1! JUDGE YOUNG: I REVIEWED THAT IN THE LAST MATTER. 
12 MR. FERRICKS: YEAH. IN THAT TAPE RANDY FIELDS 
13 SAYS, LOOK, FAIRNESS, WE DON'T MEAN FAIRNESS THE WAY EVERY-
14 BODY ELSE MEANS FAIRNESS, WE MEAN FAIRNESS IN A VERY SPECIFKf, 
15 PRACTICAL WAY. AND THEN GAVE CERTAIN EXAMPLES OF THIS. 
16 ONE OF THE EXAMPLES HE GIVES IN THE VIDEOTAPE IS FIRING 
17 SOMEBODY WITHOUT GIVING THEM AN OPPORTUNITY TO DO WHAT'S 
18 BEEN REQUESTED OF THEM. 
19 NOW, MRS. FIELDS, IN ITS MOTION HERE FOR RE-
20 CONSIDERATION FROM RELIEF FROM THE ORDER, HAS LAID OUT FOR 
21 THE COURT A NUMBER OF INSTANCES WHERE MRS. FIELDS SUPPOSEDLY 
22 RESERVED THE AT-WILL PRIVILEGE, AS JUSTICE ZIMMERMAN HAS 
23 CALLED IT, AND SUGGESTED, BECAUSE THOSE AREAS ARE LAID OUT 
24 IN VERY STARK RELIEF, THAT IT IS A CLEAR AND CONSPICUOUS 
25 RETENTION OF THE AT-WILL PREROGATIVE. IN MR. TREMBLY'S 
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CASE, AND YOUR HONOR, I'M NOT TRYING TO ARGUE POWER, RECOG-
NIZING POWER IS A CERTAIN BACKGROUND TO WHAT WE'RE TALKING 
ABOUT TODAY, BUT IN MR. TREMBLY'S CASE, THE HANDBOOK THAT 
IS ATTACHED TO MRS. FIELDS' MOTION SAYS THAT THESE POLICIES 
AND PROCEDURES CHANGE, THAT THE BEST SOURCE OF INFORMATION 
FOR YOU ABOUT THE COMPANY IS THE STATEMENTS OF YOUR SUPER-
VISOR. AND MR. TREMBLY'S SUPERVISOR, CRAIG ATNIP, HAS 
EXPLAINED IN HIS DEPOSITION, AND I'VE CITED A NUMBER OF 
PLACES IN PART 3 OF MY MEMORANDUM OPPOSING THIS MOTION, 
WHERE MR. ATNIP SAYS THE POLICY OF THE COMPANY IS THAT WE 
WILL FOLLOW THE PROCEDURES, WE WILL GIVE PEOPLE THE CHANCE 
TO DO WHAT IS EXPECTED OF THEM. 
JUDGE YOUNG: WELL, THE PROBLEM THAT I HAVE IS 
COMING TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THE COMPANY DID SOMETHING 
RATHER SPECIFIC TO CHANGE THE AT-WILL AGREEMENT TO AN 
IMPLIED-IN-FACT AGREEMENT AND SO FAR I HAVEN'T HEARD A 
SPECIFIC PROMISE THAT IS MADE. WHEN YOU SAY THEY'LL FOLLOW 
THESE PROCEDURES, IT THEN—I WOULD HAVE TO INFER FROM THAT 
THAT YOU THINK THAT IN EVERY CASE WHERE THERE IS A PERFORM-
ANCE DEFECT THE COMPANY IS OBLIGATED TO GO THROUGH THIS 
PROCEDURE BEFORE THEY CAN TERMINATE ANYONE. 
MR. FERRICKS: YOUR HONOR, I THINK THAT THERE 
IS A STRONG POSSIBILITY THAT THAT'S THE CASE, ALTHOUGH, 
I DON'T THINK I HAVE TO PROFFER THAT ON BEHALF OF MR. TREMBLY 
IN ORDER TO PREVAIL FOR HIM. HIS UNDERSTANDING, BASED UPON 
Ik 
000884 
WHAT HE WAS TOLD, AND THE WAY HE CONDUCTED HIMSELF, AND 
THE WAY HIS SUPERVISORS CONDUCTED THEMSELVES IN THE COMPANY, 
IS SUFFICIENT. I DON'T THINK I NEED TO SAY OR PROVE IN 
ORDER TO PREVAIL THAT MRS. FIELDS COMPLETELY REJECTED OR 
SURRENDERED, AS THE COURT, SUPREME COURT HAS SAID, SURREN-
DERED THE AT-WILL PRIVILEGE, BUT I THINK THEY HAVE, YOUR 
HONOR. I THINK MRS. FIELDS, BECAUSE OF WHAT THEY HAVE SAID 
TO THEIR COMPANY, AND BECAUSE IN THEIR POLICY AND PROCEDURES 
MANUALS THEY HAVE SAID LOOK, ALTHOUGH WE WILL GENERALLY 
FOLLOW A DISCIPLINARY PROCESS BECAUSE WE ARE AT-WILL, THERE 
STILL MAY BE INSTANCES WHERE YOU CAN BE TERMINATED IMME-
DIATELY FOR CONDUCT. BECAUSE WE WILL FOLLOW A DISCIPLINARY 
PROCESS BECAUSE WE ARE AT-WILL YOU CAN STILL BE TERMINATED. 
IN THE POLICY AND PROCEDURES MANUAL IT SAYS 
BECAUSE OF THE APPARENT ERROSION OF THE AT-WILL DOCTRINE 
WE WILL ALWAYS FOLLOW THESE PROCEDURES. I HAVE ATTACHED 
THAT AS TAB NO. 3 TO MY BRIEF OPPOSING THIS. IT'S THE COM-
PANY'S PHILOSOPHY. "AT THE COMPANY ALL EMPLOYEES ARE 'AT-
WILL' EMPLOYEES SUBJECT TO TERMINATION AT ANY TIME WITH 
OR WITHOUT CAUSE." THAT'S A FAIRLY EMPHATIC STATEMENT. 
BUT IT FOLLOWS IT UP, "IN ANY EVENT, IN LIGHT OF THE 
APPARENT ERROSION OF THE AT-WILL DOCTRINE, WE SHOULD ALSO 
BE PREPARED TO DEFEND ANY TERMINATION. FOR EXAMPLE, NO 
PERSON SHOULD BE TERMINATED IF HE OR SHE DID NOT KNOW, OR 
SHOULD NOT HAVE KNOWN, WHAT WAS EXPECTED. THE RESPONSIBILITY] 
15 
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1 IS THE SUPERVISOR'S TO ENSURE THAT EACH EMPLOYEE RECEIVES 
2 GOOD TRAINING IN WHAT WILL BE REQUIRED OF THEM, AND CONSIS-
3 TENT COACHING IF PRACTICAL." 
4 SO HERE IS MRS. FIELDS MAKING VERY EQUIVOCAL 
5 STATEMENTS TO THEIR EMPLOYEES, NOT TO JOE TREMBLY, I DON'T 
6 THINK I NEED TO PROVE EVERY EMPLOYEE, BUT TO JOE TREMBLY, 
^ SAYING THAT YES, THERE IS THIS AT-WILL THING OUT THERE BUT 
8 WE, FOR US, FAIRNESS MEANS SOMETHING DIFFERENT, IT DOESN'T 
9 MEAN RACE, RELIGION AND SEXUAL HARRASSMENT, IT MEANS SOME-
10 THING VERY SPECIFIC AND PERSONAL. IN THE VIDEOTAPE DEBBI 
11 FIELDS SAYS LOOK, I'M GOING TO MAKE MISTAKES, YOU'RE GOING 
12 TO MAKE MISTAKES, HOLD ME TO MY STANDARDS, REQUIRE ME TO 
13 BE ACCOUNTABLE FOR MY STANDARDS. AND THEN IT MAKES THESE 
14 EQUIVOCAL STATEMENTS IN THE POLICY AND PROCEDURES MANUAL, 
15 IN THE HANDBOOK IT MAKES EQUIVOCAL STATEMENTS, IN THE APPLI-
16 CATION PROCESS HIS EMPLOYERS HAVE MADE EQUIVOCAL STATEMENTS, 
17 IT'S PRETTY CLEAR FROM THE SANDERSON CASE THAT ORAL ASSUR-
18 ANCES CAN OVERCOME WRITTEN RESERVATION OF THE AT-WILL 
19 DOCTRINE. JUSTICE ZIMMERMAN LAYS THAT OUT VERY, VERY 
20 CLEARLY. IN FACT, IN SANDERSON, SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS 
21 REVERSED ON APPEAL BECAUSE OF THE ACTUAL QUESTION WHEN 
22 REVIEWING THOSE FACTS IN THE LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO THE 
23 EMPLOYEE, DRAWING ALL REASONABLE INFERENCES IN FAVOR OF 
24 THE EMPLOYEE, SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS OVERRULED. 
25 JUDGE YOUNG: WELL, BUT THERE WAS CLEARLY A 
16 
1 QUESTION OF FACT IN THE SANDERSON CASE THAT HAD TO GO BACK, 
2 AND THAT WAS THE QUESTION OF WHETHER HE WAS TERMINATED FOR 
3 THE TIME OFF WHILE HE WAS SICK. 
4 MR. FERRICKS: THAT IS CORRECT, YOUR HONOR. 
5 JUDGE YOUNG: THAT'S THE ONLY QUESTION, AND THAT 
6 WAS A PRETTY EASY QUESTION TO GO BACK AND BE TRIED. 
7 MR. FERRICKS: WELL, IT IS AN INTERESTING QUES-
8 TION, THOUGH. 
9 JUDGE YOUNG: I WOULD ASSUME THAT THE OTHER SIDE 
10 OF THAT EQUATION IS THAT HAD HE NOT BEEN HE WOULDN'T PREVAIL 
11 MR. FERRICKS: YEAH, AS THE SANDERSON CASE THAT'S 
12 THE FIRST WAY JUSTICE ZIMMERMAN ARTICULATES IN SANDERSON, 
13 BUT THEN HE SAYS IF THE POOR PERFORMANCE WAS RELATED TO 
14 HIS ILLNESS HE COULD NOT HAVE BEEN TERMINATED FOR POOR 
15 PERFORMANCE. 
16 NOW WE HAVE EXACTLY THE SAME SITUATION HERE. 
17 JOE TREMBLY WAS TERMINATED IN A MANNER THAT VIOLATED MRS. 
18 FIELDS' STANDARDS, THEIR EXPRESS, WRITTEN AND ORAL ASSURANCES^ 
19 TO HIM THAT HE WOULD BE GIVEN A CHANCE TO DO WHAT HE WAS 
20 BEING ASKED TO DO AND NOT BE GIVEN IMPOSSIBLY AND CONFLICTING, 
21 ASSIGNMENTS WITH IMPOSSIBLY SHORT TIMEFRAMES AND THEN USED 
22 AS A SCAPEGOAT BY HIS SUPERVISOR TO EXPLAIN WHY THINGS DIDN' 
23 OCCUR THE WAY THEY WERE SUPPOSED TO OCCUR. 
24 JUDGE YOUNG: WELL, DOESN'T EACH OF THE REQUIRE-



























ONE TO INFER THAT HE MUST HAVE BEEN TOLD AND NOTIFIED BEFORE 
OF THOSE EVENTS? FOR INSTANCE, IF HE WERE TERMINATED FOR 
FAILURE TO ENSURE THAT THERE HAD BEEN PROPER TREATMENT OF 
STAFF AND THEN THAT HAS TO BE SOMETHING THAT HE IS IMPLIEDLY 
INFORMED OF IN ADVANCE, THAT HE HAS A DUTY TO TREAT STAFF 
PROPERLY AND ENSURE THEIR TREATMENT. 
IF HE WERE TERMINATED FOR FAILURE TO VISIT ON 
A REGULAR BASIS, THE STORES IN THE NEW DISTRICT THAT HE 
NOW WAS IN CHARGE OF, THAT IS A FAIRLY SPECIFIC CRITERIA 
AND HE WOULD CERTAINLY HAVE A PRIOR UNDERSTANDING OF THE 
RESPONSIBILITY TO DO THAT. 
IF HE WERE TERMINATED FOR, I THINK THE THIRD 
THING YOU SAID WAS, NOT HOLDING TO A HIGH ENOUGH STANDARD, 
IN HIS OWN PERFORMANCE, THEN THAT'S A BASIS UPON WHICH HE 
CAN BE MEASURED AGAINST WHAT WAS EXPECTED OF HIM BECAUSE 
OF A PRIOR DISCUSSION. 
MR. FERRICKS: HERE'S THE PROBLEM WITH THAT, 
YOUR HONOR. THE VERY STORE MANAGERS WHO KERRI KELLER WENT 
BACK TO FLORIDA, QUITE AGGRAVATED BY THE WAY, BECAUSE SHE 
MISSED A SKI WEEKEND WITH HER HUSBAND, WAS SENT BACK TO 
FLORIDA OVER A WEEKEND AND MET WITH THESE STORE MANAGERS. 
AND I LISTED WRITTEN STATEMENTS FROM THEM CRITICIZING JOE 
TREMBLY FOR NOT GIVING THEM MORE SUPPORT AND GUIDANCE. 
THOSE ARE THE VERY STORE MANAGERS THAT KERRI KELLER SENT 
JOE TREMBLY TO THAT DISTRICT TO FIND OUT WHETHER THEY WERE 
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1 PERFORMING, AND SUGGESTED THAT HE REVIEW THEIR PERFORMANCE 
2 AND MOVE THEM TOWARDS BEING ELIMINATED FROM THE COMPANY. 
3 THOSE ARE THE VERY STORE MANAGERS. IT'S A WHIPSAW, YOUR 
4 HONOR. 
5 JOE TREMBLY, IN FEBRUARY, I WANT YOU TO GO DOWN 
6 AND I WANT YOU TO REVIEW THESE STORE MANAGERS AND WE THINK 
7 THEY'RE JUST GOING TO DRIBBLE OUT OF THE SYSTEM BECAUSE 
8 THEY'RE NOT PERFORMING UP TO PAR SO MAKE YOUR--YOU HAVE 
9 DONE THE EVALUATIONS AND WHATNOT. AND THEN IN MARCH SHE 
10 GOES BACK AND SAID, BUT YOU'RE NOT SUPPORTING THESE PEOPLE 
11 SUFFICIENTLY AND THEY'RE UPSET AT YOU BECAUSE OF THAT. -' 
12 THAT'S WHAT'S NOT FAIR AND THAT'S WHAT IS INCONSISTENT. 
13 WITH REGARD TO GETTING AROUND TO VISITING ALL 
14 THE STORES. JOE TREMBLY, KERRI KELLER SAID, JOE, WE HAVE 
15 A MAJOR PROBLEM AT THIS ONE STORE, GO IN THERE AND TRAIN 
16 THE STORE MANAGERS AS TO HOW TO DO THINGS. NOW, THIS 
17 TRAINING PROCESS IS SEVERAL WEEKS LONG. AND WHILE YOU'RE 
18 DOING IT YOU CAN'T JUST LEAVE THE STORE. YOU ARE ESSENTIALLY 
19 RUNNING THE STORE AND TRYING TO TRAIN A NEW MANAGER THERE. 
20 SO HE CAN'T BOTH RUN THAT STORE AND BE OUT AT THE SEVEN 
21 OR EIGHT OTHER STORES WHICH ARE SOME DISTANCE AWAY, THAT 
22 REQUIRE HIM TO TRAVEL. HE CAN'T BE DOING THOSE THINGS 
23 SIMULTANEOUSLY. 
24 WITH REGARD TO HIS STANDARDS, WHAT I'M SAYING 
25 IS, THE GENERAL STANDARDS IN THE DISTRICT, WHETHER OR NOT 
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WHEN MR. BAIRD AND MS. KELLER WENT THROUGH THE DISTRICT 
THEY'RE INSPECTING FOR A VARIETY OF THINGS UNDER THE COMPANY 
STANDARDS, AND CLEANLINESS OF THE STORE, THE APPEARANCES 
OF THE EMPLOYEES, THE QUALITY OF THE FOOD, THEIR INTERACTION 
WITH CUSTOMERS, AND THINGS LIKE THAT. AND SO THERE WAS 
SOME GENERAL DISCUSSION ABOUT THE QUALITY IN THIS DISTRICT 
WAS NOT UP TO PAR. NOW KEEP IN MIND THAT JOE TREMBLY WAS 
SENT DOWN THERE AS AN INTERIM MANAGER, DISTRICT SALES 
MANAGER, BECAUSE THE DISTRICT WAS NOT UP TO PAR, AND BEING 
ASKED SIMULTANEOUSLY TO GET RID OF THE STORE MANAGERS WHO 
WERE NOT PERFORMING UP TO PAR, TO TRAIN A NEW STORE MANAGER 
AND TO GET AROUND AND SEE EVERYBODY IN THE DISTRICT. THESE 
ARE SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS TO HIM. AND THEN KERRI KELLER 
COMES IN AFTERWARDS AND ELIMINATES HIM BECAUSE HE DIDN'T 
DO ALL THREE AND BECAUSE, ONE, ELIMINATING STORE MANAGERS 
IS INCONSISTENT WITH TREATING THE STORE MANAGERS AND 
SUPPORTING THEM IN THEIR JOB. 
THIS IS WHAT I'M TRYING TO EXPLAIN IS THAT A 
REASONABLE JURY, YOUR HONOR, WOULD LOOK AT THESE FACTS AND 
SAY WAIT A MINUTE, MRS. FIELDS COOKIES HAS NOT LIVED UP 
TO ITS END OF THE BARGAIN. IT HAS NOT DONE WHAT THE SUPREME| 
COURT HAS SAID THAT WHAT JUSTICE STEWART SAID IN THE 
THURSTON CASE. AND THAT IS, WHEN AN EMPLOYER CREATES AN 
ATMOSPHERE OF EXPECTATION THAT THE EMPLOYEE CAN REASONABLY 
RELY UPON, THE EMPLOYER HAS TO FULFILL THAT EXPECTATION. 
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AND WHEN THE EMPLOYEE FULFILLS HIS HALF OF THE BARGAIN THAT 
THIS UNILATERAL CONTRACT, BY PERFORMING IN ACCEPTANCE OF 
THOSE EXPECTATIONS, THERE CAN BE AN IMPLIED-IN-FACT CONTRACT 
YOU KNOW, YOUR HONOR, I THINK THAT THE QUESTION 
OF WHAT WOULD A REASONABLE JUROR CONCLUDE IN THIS CASE--
WE HAVE A LITTLE BIT OF A LABORATORY EXPERIMENT IN THAT 
WE HAD ONE DAY OF TRIAL WITH MS. POWER ON HOW EXTENSIVE 
WERE THESE REPRESENTATIONS OF FAIRNESS AND SPECIFIC TREATMEN 
UNDER SPECIFIC CIRCUMSTANCES. WE HAD A JURY FOR A DAY. 
THEY HEARD MRS. FIELDS1 OPENING STATEMENT, SAW MRS. FIELDS' 
RESERVATION OF AT-WILL WITH THEIR BIG CHARTS AND THINGS, 
THEY HEARD MY OPENING STATEMENT, THEY HEARD ONE DAY OF 
EVIDENCE INCLUDING THE VIDEOTAPE AND, YOUR HONOR, I DON'T 
PRETEND TO TESTIFY FOR THE COURT, BUT MY REVIEW OF THOSE 
WITNESSES, OR JURY MEMBERS, WAS THAT THEY WERE EXTREMELY 
INTERESTED AT WHETHER OR NOT MRS. FIELDS FULFILLED ITS END 
OF THAT BARGAIN. THEY UNDERSTOOD FAIRNESS. I THINK THAT 
AS LAWYERS AND JUDGES SOMETIMES WE'RE TRAINED IN THE DISCI-
PLINE OF SKEPTICISM, WE'RE TRAINED IN THE HYPER RATIONAL 
DISCIPLINE OF EVALUATING LIFE. AND FREQUENTLY WE GO BACK 
AND WE'D LIKE TO MAKE A NEW DEAL FOR OUR CLIENT BECAUSE 
NO CLIENT IN THEIR RIGHT MIND WOULD HAVE DONE SUCH A THING 
IF THEY'D REALLY BEEN THINKING ABOUT IT. MRS. FIELDS, IN 
ITS RIGHT MIND, NEVER WOULD HAVE ABANDONED THE PRIVILEGE 
OF AT-WILL IF THEY'D BEEN PROPERLY THINKING ABOUT WHAT THEY 
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WERE DOING BECAUSE IT'S SUCH A BENEFICIAL PRIVILEGE. WELL, 
MRS. FIELDS DID DO THAT. MRS. FIELDS DID PANDER TO THE 
EMPLOYEES. 
JUDGE YOUNG: I UNDERSTAND YOUR POSITION. 
MR. HIMONAS? 
MR. HIMONAS: BEFORE I BEGIN, DOES THE COURT 
HAVE ANY QUESTIONS FOR ME? 
JUDGE YOUNG: NO, GO AHEAD. 
MR. HIMONAS: I WILL SAY THAT IT SEEMS TO ME 
THERE MAY BE A DISTINCTION BETWEEN MR. TREMBLY AND MS. POWER 
AND MS. POWERS WAS TERMIANTED, IN PART, BECAUSE OF REDUCTION 
OF FORCE, AND A SIGNIFICANT PART BECAUSE OF REDUCTION OF 
FORCE. AND THE POSITION WAS NOT REPLACED. I ASSUME MR. 
TREMBLY'S HAS BEEN REPLACED, THAT IT IS A REMAINING POSITION 
IN THE COMPANY. AND THAT HE WAS TOLD OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES 
TO GO DOWN AND TRY TO ENSURE THAT THERE WAS PROPER TREATMENT 
OF THE STAFF IN THIS DISTRICT WHERE HE WORKED AND SO ON. 
IN THE HANDBOOK, AND WE'LL REVIEW IT AS WELL, 
IT'S ONE OF THE EXCLUSIVE INSTRUCTIONS TALKING ABOUT CONDUCT 
ABUSING PERSONNEL AS ONE OF THE EXPLICIT REASONS. IT'S 
SET FORTH--
JUDGE YOUNG: LET ME ASK YOU THIS. WHAT IS THE 
PERFORMANCE OF MRS. FIELDS? WHAT IS THE PRACTICE OF MRS. 
FIELDS WHEN IT IS CONSIDERED THAT THERE IS A PERFORMANCE 
DEFICIENCY? 
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MR. HIMONAS: THEY PUT THE INDIVIDUAL ON SUSPEN-
SION. IN THIS PARTICULAR CASE, YOUR HONOR, THEY CONDUCTED 
AN INVESTIGATION, AT THE COMPLETION OF THE INVESTIGATION 
CONCLUDED TERMINATION WAS PROPER. THAT ALL STARTED FROM 
TWO UNSOLICITED PHONE CALLS FROM TWO MANAGERS DOWN THERE 
CLAIMING THAT THEY WERE BEING HARRASSED AND ABUSED BY JOE 
TREMBLY. THAT'S WHAT STARTED THE INVESTIGATORY PROCESS. 
BUT I THINK, YOUR HONOR, MOST IMPORTANTLY, THIS 
IS REALLY TAKING US VERY FAR AFIELD OF WHERE WE NEED TO 
BE BECAUSE IF MRS. FIELDS IS AN AT-WILL COMPANY IT MAKES 
ABSOLUTELY NO DIFFERENCE WHY HE IS TERMINATED, WHETHER HE 
IS TERMINATED AS A RESULT OF A REDUCTION IN FORCE OR WHETHER 
HE IS TERMINATED FOR PERFORMANCE ISSUES. IF THE PRESUMPTION 
OF AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT DOES NOT OVERCOME, YOUR HONOR, WE 
CAN TERMINATE AT ANY TIME FOR ANY REASON OR NO REASON AT 
ALL, WITH OR WITHOUT CAUSE. AND THAT'S WHY MUCH OF WHAT 
YOU'VE HEARD FROM MR. FERRICKS ASSUMES THAT WE'VE ALREADY 
OVERCOME THE AT-WILL PRESUMPTION. AND THE POINT IS HERE, 
AS IN HODGSON, AS IN POWER, WE'VE NEVER OVERCOME THAT 
PRESUMPTION. MRS. FIELDS HAS RETAINED THE UNFETTERED 
CONTRACTUAL RIGHT TO TERMINATE EMPLOYMENT AT ANY TIME FOR 
ANY REASON AND, LIKEWISE, MR. TREMBLY HAD THE UNFETTERED 
CONTRACTUAL RIGHT TO TERMINATE HIS EMPLOYMENT WITH MRS. 
FIELDS AT ANY TIME HE CHOSE. 
MR. TREMBLY WAS, IN FACT, AN AT-WILL EMPLOYEE. 
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1 AT THE TIME HE WAS HIRED, YOUR HONOR, MR. TREMBLY, JUST 
2 LIKE MS. POWER, SIGNED, COMPLETED AND SIGNED AN APPLICATION 
3 EXPRESSLY PROVIDING THAT HIS EMPLOYMENT WITH MRS. FIELDS 
4 WOULD REMAIN AT-WILL. 
5 JUDGE YOUNG: I AM AWARE OF ALL OF THAT. I'VE 
6 READ THAT IN YOUR PLEADINGS. THE CONCERN THAT I HAVE IS, 
1 IS THAT IF MRS. FIELDS TAKES THE POSITION THAT AT-WILL MEANS 
8 THAT IT CAN TERMINATE ONE PERSON AT-WILL, THEORETICALLY 
9 WITHOUT CAUSE OR JUSTIFICATION, AND IT CAN THEN ASK ANOTHER 
10 PERSON TO BE PLACED ON PROBATION FOR A PERIOD OF TIME, IT 
11 SEEMS TO ME THAT THERE MAY BE THE GREAT POTENTIAL FOR ABUSE 
12 THAT THEY WOULD BE USING DIFFERENT STANDARDS WITHIN THE 
13 COMPANY FOR THE SAME KIND OF PERFORMANCE DEFICIENCY. AND 
14 THAT BOTHERS ME BECAUSE I DON'T THINK THE COMPANY WOULD 
15 RETAIN AN ABSOLUTE, UNFETTERED RIGHT TO TREAT THE EMPLOYEES 
16 DIFFERENTLY FOR THE SAME DEFICIENT CONDUCT. 
17 MR. HIMONAS: WE DON'T HAVE THAT CASE HERE. 
18 WE DON'T HAVE A BENCHMARK. BUT THE COMPANY DOES RETAIN 
19 THAT CONTRACTUAL RIGHT AND THAT IS THE POINT OF THE HANDBOOK] 
20 SETTING FORTH IN COMPLETE, UNAMBIGUOUS LANGUAGE THAT, LOOK, 
21 LIKE EVERY OTHER COMPANY IN THE UNITED STATES WE STRIVE 
22 TO FOLLOW THE FOLLOWING PROCEDURE WHEN WE TERMINATE PEOPLE. 
23 YOU KNOW, WE STRIVE TO DO IT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FOLLOWING 
24
 POLICY. WE WANT TO HAVE A REASON AND, IN FACT, WE DID HAVE 
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 A VERY GOOD REASON IN THIS PARTICULAR CASE, YOUR HONOR, 
2h 
BUT WE STILL RETAIN THE CONTRACTUAL RIGHT TO TERMINATE AT 
ANY TIME AND FOR ANY REASON. JUST AS MR. TREMBLY HAS THE 
RIGHT TO TERMINATE HIS EMPLOYMENT AT ANY TIME AND FOR ANY 
REASON. 
FOR EXAMPLE--WOULD THE COURT LIKE A COPY? 
JUDGE YOUNG: I KNOW WHAT THE LANGUAGE OF THE 
COMPANY'S HANDBOOK IS. I KNOW WHAT THE CONTRACT PROVISIONS 
ARE THAT HE HAS SIGNED. I'VE READ THE MATERIAL THAT YOU'VE 
PRESENTED. I DIDN'T COME IN HERE WITHOUT LOOKING AT SOME-
THING. 
MR. HIMONAS: I KNOW YOU GOT OUT OF HERE FAIRLY 
LATE YESTERDAY. THE POINT IS, THERE IS A DIFFERENCE BETWEEN 
A POLICY AND CONTRACTUAL RIGHT. WE'RE TALKING ABOUT AN 
IMPLIED-IN-FACT CONTRACT TO BE TERMINATED ONLY FOR CAUSE. 
THAT IS THE CLAIM THAT IS BEFORE 'EM. DOES HE HAVE AN 
IMPLIED-IN-FACT CONTRACTUAL BASIS LIMITING THE COMPANY'S 
RIGHT TO TERMINATE HIM ONLY FOR CAUSE? IF HE IS AN AT-WILL 
EMPLOYEE IT DOESN'T EXIST, YOUR HONOR. AND EVEN THOUGH 
IT MAY NOT SEEM FAIR AT TIMES, EVEN IF WE DON'T LIKE IT, 
AND COMPANIES STRIVE NOT TO DO IT, THE FACT OF THE MATTER 
IS, IF THE PRESUMPTION ISN'T OVERCOME, MRS. FIELDS, LIKE 
ANY OTHER AT-WILL COMPANY, MAY TERMINATE EMPLOYMENT AT ANY 
TIME FOR ANY REASON OR FOR NO REASON AT ALL. 
YOUR HONOR, THIS IS THE HODGSON CASE. IF YOU 
WILL RECALL IN THAT CASE, IN THE WORDS OF JUSTICE HOWE, 
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THE ISSUE PRESENTED WAS WHETHER THE EMPLOYER HAD MODIFIED 
THE PLAINTIFF'S AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT STATUS BY DISCLOSING 
TO HER AT THE TIME SHE WAS INTERVIEWED THAT THE COMPANY 
FOLLOWED DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURES TO GIVE EMPLOYEES A CHANCE 
TO CORRECT DEFICIENCIES. YET IT'S NEARLY VERBATIM WHAT 
MR. FERRICKS IS ALLEGING TOOK PLACE HERE. A UNANIMOUS 
SUPREME COURT NOTED THE FOLLOWING. "WHEN AN EMPLOYEE HAND-
BOOK CONTAINS A CLEAR AND CONSPICUOUS DISCLAIMER OF CON-
TRACTUAL LIABILITY, ANY OTHER AGREEMENT MUST BE CONSTRUED 
IN LIGHT OF THAT DISCLAIMER." AND IN LIGHT OF THAT THE 
SUPREME COURT HELD, "THAT SUCH ORAL REPRESENTATIONS FROM 
THE EMPLOYERS' MANAGER DID NOT CREATE A MATERIAL ISSUE OF _ 
FACT," AND AFFIRMED SUMMARY JUDGMENT BASED UPON THE FACT 
THAT, AS HERE, PLAINTIFF SIGNED A STATEMENT THAT THE EMPLOY-
MENT WAS AT-WILL AT THE TIME THE EMPLOYMENT COMMENCED AND 
THAT AFTERWARDS THE EMPLOYER ISSUED A HANDBOOK STATING THAT 
EMPLOYMENT WITH THE COMPANY WAS AT-WILL. 
THERE'S ALSO--
JUDGE YOUNG: ALL RIGHT. 
MR. HIMONAS: I'M SORRY, YOUR HONOR. 
JUDGE YOUNG: THAT'S FINE. 
MR. HIMONAS: THERE'S ALSO A SMALL MISREPRESEN-
TATION THAT I THINK WE SHOULD TAKE THE TIME TO CORRECT RIGHT 
NOW, AND THERE IS MR. FERRICKS' STATEMENT TO THE COURT, 
THAT AT THE TIME HE WAS FIRED HE WAS TOLD BY MR. MITCHELL 
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1 DORIN AT THE VERY INCEPTION OF HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE 
2 COMPANY WE HAD TO GO THROUGH THE DISCIPLINARY PROCESS JUST 
3 AS IN HODGSON. THAT SIMPLY IS NOT TRUE, YOUR HONOR. MR. 
4 TREMBLY'S TESTIMONY IS THAT HE WAS HIRED IN NOVEMBER OF 
5 1986 BY AN INDIVIDUAL BY THE NAME OF NABILLE DEJONI AND 
6 THIS WAS A SUBSEQUENT CONVERSATION SEVERAL MONTHS LATER 
7 WITH MR. DORIN. THAT CONVERSATION, HOWEVER, PRECEDED THE 
8 ISSUANCE OF THE HANDBOOK. AND AS THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
9 NOTED IN BREHANY AND IN MORTON THIOKOL, THIS IS A UNILATERAL 
10 CONTRACT. AND THE TERMS OF THE UNILATERAL CONTRACT, YOUR 
11 HONOR, MAY BE AMENDED. AND THE CONTINUED PROVISION OF 
12 EMPLOYMENT BY MRS. FIELDS TO THE EMPLOYEE, JOE TREMBLY, 
13 IN THIS CASE, PROVIDES THE CONSIDERATION FOR THE COMPANY 
14 TO UNILATERALLY AMEND THE CONTRACT. 
15 NOW, IT IS OUR POSITION IN THIS CASE THAT JOE 
16 TREMBLY'S EMPLOYMENT WITH MRS. FIELDS WAS AT-WILL FROM DAY 
17 ONE AND HE ACKNOWLEDGED IT IN WRITING, YOUR HONOR. HE SIGNECj 
18 OFF ON A DOCUMENT TO THAT EFFECT AND THAT NEVER CHANGED. 
19 BUT EVEN IF IT DID, FOR WHATEVER REASON, IF THE COURT WERE 
20 CONCERNED THAT IT DID, ALL THE REPRESENTATIONS THAT MR. 
21 FERRICKS RELIED UPON, YOUR HONOR, TOOK PLACE BEFORE THE 
22 ISSUANCE OF THIS HANDBOOK, BEFORE MR. TREMBLY USED THIS 
23 HANDBOOK TO TRAIN ANOTHER INDIVIDUAL. AT THAT TIME THERE 
24 IS A UNILATERAL AMENDMENT TO THE CONTRACT PROVIDING FOR 
25 AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT AS RECOGNIZED BY BREHANY AND AS RECOGNIZEE 
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1 BY MORTON THIOKOL, YOUR HONOR. 
2 JUDGE YOUNG: ALL RIGHT. THANK YOU. THE COURT 
3 FINDS THAT THE PLAINTIFF'S [SIC] MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM 
4 THE ORDER SHOULD BE AND THE SAME IS HEREIN GRANTED. 
5 THE COURT FINDS THAT THE AT-WILL ARRANGEMENT, 
6 OR RELATIONSHIP WITH JOE TREMBLY TO MRS. FIELDS COOKIES, 
7 REMAINED AT-WILL AND THAT THERE HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO BE 
8 AN ADEQUATE FACTUAL BASIS FOR THE COURT TO CONCLUDE THAT 
9 THAT HAS BEEN CHANGED TO DRAW AN AT-WILL CONTRACT TO IMPLIED-! 
10 IN-FACT CONTRACT, THAT THE BURDEN REMAINS THE CHALLENGING 
11 EMPLOYEE'S RESPONSIBILITY TO ESTABLISH THAT THERE IS SOME 
12 BASIS OTHER THAN SIMPLY ASSURANCES THAT THE COMPANY WILL 
13 BE FAIR. THERE'S NO REASON FOR ME TO CONCLUDE THAT THE 
14 COMPANY WAS NOT FAIR IN THIS CASE AND THAT THIS CASE WOULD 
15 NOT BE TREATED SUBSTANTIALLY THE SAME WERE IT ANY EMPLOYEE. 
16 I THINK THAT THE AT-WILL RELATIONSHIP HAS NOT 
17 BEEN NEUTRALIZED BY CONDUCT OF THE COMPANY AND, THUS, REMAINS 
18 INTACT. 
19 MR. HIMONAS, IF YOU WILL PREPARE AN ORDER 
20 CONSISTENT? 
21 MR. HIMONAS: CERTAINLY, YOUR HONOR. THANK YOU, 
22 YOUR HONOR. 
23 JUDGE YOUNG: NOW HAVING RENDERED THAT DECISION 
24 THE MATTER IS SET FOR TRIAL, IS IT NOT? 
25 MR. HIMONAS: YES, IT IS. 
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1 JUDGE YOUNG: DOES THAT RESOLVE THE MATTER FOR 
2 THE PURPOSES OF TRIAL, MR. FERRICKS? 
3 MR. HIMONAS: IT DOES NOT, YOUR HONOR. 
4 MR. FERRICKS: I BELIEVE IT DOES. 
5 MR. HIMONAS: THERE IS A COUNTERCLAIM PENDING, 
6 YOUR HONOR. HOWEVER, I'M INFORMED BY MY CLIENT TODAY, TO 
7 AVOID THE COSTS ATTENDANT TO THE TRIAL, WE WILL VOLUNTARILY 
8 DISMISS THAT. WE FELT PREJUDICED ON OUR COUNTERCLAIM AND 
9 RESERVE IT FOR AN APPEAL, IF NECESSARY. 
10 JUDGE YOUNG: ALL RIGHT. 
11 MR. HIMONAS: SO THE TRIAL IS— 
12 JUDGE YOUNG: THE TRIAL IS STRICKEN. THE COURT 
13 NOTES THAT THE COUNTERCLAIM IS VOLUNTARILY DISMISSED WITHOUT 
14 PREJUDICE IN THE EVENT THAT THE MATTER SHOULD BE RECONSIDERED 
15 BY THE COURT AT SOME FUTURE TIME AS A RESULT OF APPELLATE 
16 OR SOME OTHER DECISION. 
17 MR. HIMONAS: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 
18 JUDGE YOUNG: THANK YOU EACH FOR YOUR PRESEN-
19 TATIONS. 
20 MR. FERRICKS: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. THANK 
21 YOU FOR THE OPPORTUNITY TO ARGUE, YOUR HONOR. 
22 CWHEREUPON, THE HEARING WAS CONCLUDED). 
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C E R T I F I C A T E 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
SS. 
I, EILEEN M. AMBROSE, HEREBY CERTIFY THAT I AM 
A CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER OF THE STATE OF UTAH; THAT 
AS SUCH CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER, I ATTENDED THE 
HEARING OF THE ABOVE-MENTIONED MATTER AT THAT TIME AND 
PLACE SET OUT HEREIN; THAT THEREAT I TOOK DOWN IN SHORTHAND 
THE TESTIMONY GIVEN AND THE PROCEEDINGS HAD THEREIN; AND 
THAT THEREAFTER I TRANSCRIBED MY SAID SHORTHAND NOTES INTO 
TYPEWRITING, AND THAT THE FOREGOING TRANSCRIPTION IS A 
FULL, TRUE, AND CORRECT TRANSCRIPTION OF THE SAME. 
EILEEN MJ AMBROSE, X.S.R. 
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES: 
JANUARY 14TH, 1996 
